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ABSTRACT 
Many studies have shown that commercially-sponsored clinical 
trials are more likely than publicly-financed trials to produce results 
that are favorable to the sponsoring firm.  There is no research, how-
ever, to support the allegation that industry sponsors intentionally 
design methodologically inferior studies.  Rather than empirically de-
termining whether commercially financed research is less sound than 
its publicly supported counterpart, this Article focuses on the finan-
cial incentives created by the current regulatory climate.  This Article 
demonstrates that pharmaceutical companies are being put to a cruel 
choice between optimally advancing the medical literature and hon-
oring their fiduciary duties to shareholders by designing suboptimal 
phase IV protocols.  As pharmaceutical companies have little incen-
tive to design suboptimal protocols for other types of trials, this Arti-
cle focuses exclusively on non-required post-marketing studies not in-
tended to support supplemental NDA labeling changes.  After 
arguing that the present regime is incapable of reining in conflicted 
sponsors, this Article offers a solution that has the potential to align 
industry interests with the public health. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Studies have shown that commercially-funded clinical trials are 
more likely than publicly-financed trials to produce results that are 
favorable to the sponsoring firm.  This Article investigates one possi-
ble reason for the disparate outcomes—the theory that industry 
sponsors intentionally design methodologically inferior trials.  Rather 
than empirically determining whether commercially financed re-
search is less sound than its publicly supported counterpart, this pa-
per focuses on the financial incentives created by the current regula-
tory climate.  This Article purports to demonstrate that 
pharmaceutical companies are being put to a cruel choice between 
optimally advancing the medical literature and honoring their fiduci-
ary duties to shareholders by designing suboptimal phase IV proto-
cols.  As pharmaceutical companies have little incentive to design 
suboptimal protocols for other types of trials, this Article focuses exclu-
sively on non-required post-marketing studies not intended to support supple-
mental NDA labeling changes (hereinafter referred to as “voluntary, 
non-label-seeking, post-approval studies”).  After arguing that the 
present regime is incapable of reining in conflicted sponsors, it offers 
a solution that has the potential to align industry interests with the 
public health. 
Part II of the Article demonstrates that if commercial sponsors 
are intentionally designing suboptimal trials, the proper response is 
not to rebuke the companies, but rather to reconfigure the system to 
provide firms with a financial incentive to conduct such research.  
This Article relies on findings from the social psychology literature to 
explain other authors’ tendencies to harshly reprimand pharmaceu-
tical companies, and stipulates that this Article avoids such demoniza-
tion by focusing on the situational influences that sculpt industry  
action.1   
Part III begins by introducing the research that shows that  
industry- funded trials are more likely than taxpayer-financed trials to 
produce positive data.  After discussing commercial sponsors’ increas-
ing ability to exercise control over the design of clinical trials during 
the last two decades, it questions previous findings that suggest that 
private research is at least as methodologically sound as publicly-
funded research.  Part III then articulates the myriad ways in which 
pharmaceutical companies may have an incentive to design trials that 
 1 “Demonization” is a word used by Arthur Caplan to depict authors’ tendency 
to staunchly criticize pharmaceutical companies.  See, e.g., Arthur L. Caplan, Indicting 
Big Pharma, 93 AM. SCIENTIST 68, 68 (2005). 
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are suboptimally informative to the medical community but more 
likely than the optimal designs to yield favorable results.  For exam-
ple, industry sponsors may feel financial pressure to inappropriately 
measure surrogate outcomes or run a study that is too short to ade-
quately determine whether the drug in question is safer than a com-
petitor’s product.  Finally, Part III offers suggestions for future re-
search that could empirically determine whether pharmaceutical 
companies are indeed more likely than disinterested academics to 
design suboptimal phase IV trials. 
Part IV begins by demonstrating that the FDA, physicians, insur-
ance companies, journal editors, and the tort system are all incapable 
of eliminating the industry’s incentive to design methodologically 
suboptimal trials.  After discussing solutions proffered by other au-
thors, Part IV argues that the interests of commercial sponsors and 
the public health could be aligned by (a) creating a federal body that 
disseminates comparative data on alternative therapies, and (b) re-
structuring the insurance system so that consumers have a financial 
incentive to seek out physicians and health plans that are not im-
properly influenced by methodologically suboptimal studies. 
Finally, Part V offers a brief conclusion. 
II. WHOSE FAULT IS IT?: A LESSON FROM STANLEY MILGRAM 
A. The Fundamental Attribution Error—A Brief Description 
The “fundamental attribution error” is a phrase used to describe 
the natural human tendency to only see disposition, even though 
situational forces are far more controlling.2  When person A observes 
an action taken by person B, A automatically and unconsciously as-
sumes that B acted as she did because of B’s internal preferences.  
This premise is true notwithstanding the fact that B’s action was 
hardly a choice at all, as exogenous pressures—rather than B’s dispo-
sition—caused her to behave in that manner.3  The groundbreaking 
series of studies conducted by Yale psychologist Stanley Milgram pre-
sents the paradigmatic example of the fundamental attribution er-
 2 Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational 
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 
136 (2003) [hereinafter Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation]; Jon Hanson & David Yosi-
fon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. 
L.J. 1, 24–25 (2004) [hereinafter Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character] . 
 3 The fundamental attribution error also speaks to the idea that internal cogni-
tive biases tend to plague decision-making even though third party observers attrib-
ute human behavior to conscious, rational thought.  This section, however, focuses 
on external situational pressure. 
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ror.4  The contribution of Milgram’s studies to the understanding of 
human behavior has been elegantly described elsewhere by Hanson 
and Yosifon: 
     Milgram arranged an experimental situation in which sub-
jects—compensated volunteers—were led to believe that they 
were participating in a study on memory.  In the basic design of 
the experiment, the subject first met another “subject”—who was 
actually one of Milgram’s confederates—and the two drew straws 
to determine what part in the experiment they would take.  The 
confederate was inevitably assigned the role of the “student,” and 
promptly strapped into a chair with electrodes affixed to his body.  
The true subject was (seemingly randomly) assigned the role of 
the “teacher,” and was instructed to administer an electric 
shock—by flipping a switch on a shock box—each time the “stu-
dent” incorrectly answered a question posed by the experimenter.  
The “teacher” was led to believe that the shocks would be painful, 
and that their intensity would increase in fifteen-volt increments 
with each wrong answer—from 15 volts all the way up to 450 volts, 
which was labeled “Danger! XXX!” on the shock box.   
     Before the experiment was undertaken, Milgram described the 
protocol to lay people and psychologists and then asked both 
groups to estimate how far most “teachers” would go with the 
shocking before refusing to continue.  Those surveyed believed, 
as might the reader, that most would refuse early on.  College 
students predicted that just 1 in 100 subjects would shock all the 
way to 450 volts, and professional psychologists predicted that 
only 1 in 1000—“the sadists”—would go that far. 
     . . . . 
     In the basic design of the experiment, 100% of the subjects 
continued with the shocking at least to 350 volts, and 65% went 
all the way to 450 volts (“Danger! XXX!”).  The dispositionist as-
sumption, that people would never freely choose to knowingly in-
flict pain like that on an innocent subject in the absence of a 
highly salient situational force—such as a gun to their heads—is 
robust.  But it is often wrong. In our dispositionism we fail to ap-
preciate the powerful, but unseen, situational influences over the 
subjects’ behavior in Milgram’s lab.  Milgram performed his study 
in numerous settings on hundreds of subjects who were, in all re-
spects, typical people.  They were not sadists; they were simply, 
like all of us, situational characters who were subject to unappre-
ciated but profound influences in the situation.  Indeed, Milgram 
was able to alter his subjects’ behavior by altering the situational 
influences.  By varying the proximity of the “teacher” to the “stu-
 4 Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 2, at 150–54. 
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dent,” or the “teacher” to the “experimenter,” or by altering the 
prestige of the experimental setting (by moving the location of 
the experiment from Yale to Bridgeport, Connecticut), Milgram 
discovered he could increase or decrease the level of shocking 
that subjects would be willing to administer.  
     Experiments like Milgram’s, and there are literally hundreds of 
others, have demonstrated that we place far too much emphasis 
on disposition—on an individual’s perceived motivations, prefer-
ences, choices, and will—in accounting for her conduct.  In so do-
ing we fail to appreciate the very potent, though often unnoticed, 
influences of situation.5
B. What the Fundamental Attribution Error Can Teach Us about 
Pharmaceutical Companies 
Like the rest of us, modern day critics of the pharmaceutical in-
dustry are subject to the fundamental attribution error.  Instead of 
critiquing the regulatory regime that shapes industry behavior, they 
condemn the companies as atrocious beings with bad intentions.6  
Industry critics see drug companies not as corporate actors enmeshed 
within a complex regulatory framework, but rather as personified en-
tities fulfilling internal preferences for profits.  Katharine Greider’s 
book, entitled The Big Fix: How the Pharmaceutical Industry Rips Off 
American Consumers, concludes with the following line: “Like the 
childhood bully on the block, increasingly unpopular but seemingly 
invincible, maybe the drugmakers are really asking a desperate ques-
tion: Who’s going to stop me?”7
Of course, just like the subjects in Milgram’s experiment who 
administered shocks all the way up to the line labeled “Danger! 
XXX!,” pharmaceutical companies (and their managers/directors) 
are not immoral beings who do not care about the public health.  
They are economic actors who behave according to a set of well-
established market principles.  The regulatory landscape imposed by 
the Food and Drug Administration, as well as state corporate law, 
shapes managerial decisions within firms.  Although the law is in flux 
and open to debate, legal scholars generally agree that corporate 
managers owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders only.8  If the general 
 5 Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 2, at 7–8 (citations omit-
ted). 
 6 See Caplan, supra note 1. 
 7 KATHARINE GREIDER, THE BIG FIX: HOW THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY RIPS OFF 
AMERICAN CONSUMERS 174 (2003).  
 8 See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 733, 733 n.1 (2005).  This is merely the mainstream view amongst judges and 
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consensus among legal academics is correct and this is indeed the 
law, it is illegal for a manager to make a decision that serves non-
shareholder constituencies (e.g., employees, the environment, con-
sumers, etc.) if such a decision fails to maximize shareholder wealth.  
A corporate manager that does so could theoretically be subject to 
criminal prosecution.9  Thus, a CEO of a pharmaceutical company 
would arguably be risking jail time if she chose to provide the indi-
gent with free drugs.10
C. Implications for this Article 
This Article purports to address the issues that plague consumers 
of pharmaceuticals with an understanding that, no matter what bal-
anced research and writing reveals, the drug industry is not inher-
ently evil.  Unlike the psychologists who predicted that only 0.1% of 
subjects would shock all the way to “Danger! XXX!,” this Article will 
proceed with an eye toward the situational influences that shape in-
dustry behavior.  The regulatory framework that society has given to 
legal academics.  Id.  As Professor Elhauge’s article demonstrates, there is a rather 
large minority of commentators who disagree that this is in fact the law, and suggest 
that sound policy counsels against such rigid fiduciary duties.  See generally id. 
 9 This analysis assumes that the majority of legal commentators are correct in 
their assumption that corporate managers owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders only.  
See supra note 8.  In practice, courts almost never find that a breach of fiduciary duty 
has occurred simply because a company makes a decision that appears to be for the 
benefit of non-shareholder constituencies.  Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. is certainly the ex-
ception rather than the rule.  204 Mich. 459 (Mich. 1919).  In that case, Henry Ford, 
the CEO of Ford Motor Company, announced to the public that his company was 
reinvesting its profits instead of issuing dividends, and had chosen to do so because 
he wanted “to employ still more men; to spread the benefits of this industrial system 
to the greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives and their homes.”  
Id. at 468.  The court held that the company had violated its fiduciary duty to share-
holders, since Mr. Ford’s public statement indicated that the company was reinvest-
ing its profits not for the benefit of its owners, but for the benefit of its workers and 
the public at large.  Id. at 507.  Ford Motor Co. sent a clear message to corporate man-
agers around the world:  “If you have interests beyond shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion, do not disclose them.”  Some companies still make public statements which 
suggest that corporate decisions are being made with an eye toward the interests of 
non-shareholders.  See, e.g., Aetna, Transforming Health Care in America, 
http://www.aetna.com/about/america/ (stating that “Aetna values ethical business 
principles and socially responsible actions in our business practices, policy leader-
ship, charitable giving, and community involvement.”).  It is nevertheless difficult to 
prove impropriety, since corporate managers can always argue that the public ap-
pearance of benevolence and altruism is likely to produce more wealth for share-
holders.  See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate 
Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439, 440–41 (2001). 
 10 This example assumes that the CEO’s act of charity was not a profit-
maximizing decision.  Managers can always argue that donations are in shareholders’ 
financial interests since they serve to boost the goodwill of the company.  
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drug companies, in which firms have no choice but to operate, is 
broken.  Corporate managers are supposed to serve shareholder in-
terests alone since the rest of our law—tort law, the tax code, criminal 
statutes, etc.—is supposed to protect non-shareholder constituencies 
against exploitation.11  If pharmaceutical companies’ profit-minded 
behavior is failing to optimize the public health, then the problem 
lies not with the firms themselves, but with the “other law” that is 
supposed to protect non-shareholder constituencies.  A legal regime 
that provides drug companies with an incentive to engage in subop-
timal research is equally as unfair to industry as it is to consumers.  
Big Pharma12 is not the culprit, but rather another victim, as it is be-
ing forced to choose between honoring its fiduciary obligations to 
shareholders and advancing the public health.  The good news is that 
situational forces are easier to sculpt than deeply ingrained disposi-
tions.  Just as Milgram’s subjects responded differently when the ex-
periment site was moved away from Yale, so too will Big Pharma 
change its behavior in the face of situational alterations designed to 
align the interests of consumers and industry. 
III. TINKERING WITH THE PROTOCOLS:  
INCENTIVES TO USE RESEARCH METHODS THAT FAIL TO MAXIMALLY 
INFORM THE MEDICAL COMMUNITY  
BUT ARE MORE LIKELY TO YIELD POSITIVE RESULTS 
A. The Correlation between Industry Funding and Positive Results 
Commercial sponsors provide approximately seventy percent of 
the funding for clinical drug trials in the United States.13  Numerous 
studies document the tight correlation between industry funding and 
published trial results that tout the safety and effectiveness14 of the 
 11 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 9. 
 12 “Big Pharma” is a “term used to describe the global collective of research-based 
pharmaceutical companies, of which there are an estimated 75-100.”  JEFFREY 
ROBINSON, PRESCRIPTION GAMES 1 (2001).   
 13 Michelle M. Mello et al., Academic Medical Centers’ Standards for Clinical-Trial 
Agreements with Industry, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2202, 2202 (2005). 
 14 It is important to distinguish between “efficacy” and “effectiveness.”  The 
World Health Organization defines clinical effectiveness as “the likelihood and ex-
tent of desired clinically relevant effects in patients with the specified indication.”  
Lisa. A. Bero & Drummond Rennie, Influences on the Quality of Published Drug Studies, 
12 INT’L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE 209, 209 (1996) (citing WHO, 18th Euro-
pean Symposium on Clinical Pharmacological Evaluation in Drug Control, WHO Doc. 1993 
EUR/ICP/DSE 173 (Dec. 10–13, 1991)).  Efficacy, however, refers to “any arbitrarily 
chosen effect which may or may not be clinically relevant.”  Id. 
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drug in question.15  The literature offers three plausible explanations 
for the favorable results seen in industry-sponsored research.16  First, 
pharmaceutical companies may only fund research on the most 
promising compounds, refusing to finance trials in which failure is a 
substantial possibility.17  Second, industry representatives may be 
more reluctant than academics to publish the results of failed clinical 
trials.18  Finally, the methodology of industry-sponsored trials may be 
more likely to yield favorable results than the research methods19 of 
publicly funded studies.20  This Article addresses the last of the three 
possibilities. 
B. Increased Industry Control over the Design of Trials 
Over the last two decades, pharmaceutical companies have ac-
quired significantly more control over the design of the trials they 
sponsor.21  In the late 1990s, most drug companies did not have the 
 15 See Caplan, supra note 1. 
 16 Joel Lexchin et al., Pharmaceutical Industry Sponsorship and Research Outcome and 
Quality: Systematic Review, 326 BRIT. MED. J. 1167, 1169–70 (2003) [hereinafter Lex-
chin et al., Industry Sponsorship]. 
 17 Julio S. G. Montaner et al., Industry-Sponsored Clinical Research: A Double-Edged 
Sword, 358 LANCET 1893, 1893 (2001); Lexchin et al., Industry Sponsorship, supra note 
16, at 1169. 
 18 Lexchin et al., Industry Sponsorship, supra note 16, 1170. 
 19 This paper uses the terms “methodology” and “research methods” inter-
changeably. 
 20 Lexchin et al., Industry Sponsorship, supra note 16, at 1170.  Lexchin et al. pro-
vide four explanations for the favorable results seen in industry-sponsored research.  
Whereas they identify two separate mechanisms through which industry can utilize 
research methods that are more likely to yield positive results, this paper combines 
them into one explanation.  The first mechanism identified by Lexchin et al. is truly 
flawed research methodology, where the data produced is statistically invalid because 
the analysis of the data was mathematically unsound or the control group was treated 
differently from the experimental group in a manner other than the difference be-
ing tested by the trial.  The second mechanism is a specific type of suboptimal, but 
unflawed trial, where the trial uses an inappropriate comparator.  For example, if a 
company is attempting to prove that a new drug is more efficacious than an older 
alternative, the designer of the protocol may suggest a comparatively higher dose of 
the newer drug.  See infra notes 31–36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
difference between trials that are methodologically flawed and those that are meth-
odologically suboptimal.  See infra Part III.E.v (discussing the use of inappropriate 
comparators). 
 21 MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES 29–30, 100–01, 103, 
165–66, 244–47 (2004) [hereinafter ANGELL, THE TRUTH];Thomas Bodenheimer, Un-
easy Alliance: Clinical Investigators and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1539, 1541 (2000) .  Although the majority of this Article focuses on voluntary, post-
approval studies not intended to support a label change, this section (entitled “In-
creased Industry Control over the Design of Trials”) speaks to all clinical trials 
(phases I–IV).  
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in-house experience to design protocols themselves.22 Nowadays, 
however, industry employs top-level research physicians to do the 
work.23  Moreover, much of the research funded by industry has 
shifted from academic medical centers to Contract Research Organi-
zations (CROs) and Site Management Organizations (SMOs), for-
profit companies that specialize in the implementation of protocols 
and analysis of data.24  Clinical investigators at CROs are generally 
thought to allow industry sponsors more leeway in designing proto-
cols than investigators at academic medical centers.25  Today, even 
academic medical centers do not have much input into the design of 
clinical trials; although company and academic investigators some-
times form a steering committee to discuss a trial protocol, industry 
traditionally writes the protocol, and brings in outside investigators 
pro forma, with little intention of changing the study design.26
C. Questioning the Findings that the Research Methods of Industry-
Sponsored Studies are at Least as Good as Publicly Financed Trials 
Several studies have found that the research methods of  
industry-sponsored studies are at least as good, if not better, than the 
research methods of taxpayer-financed trials.27  These studies, how-
ever, do not preclude the possibility that industry representatives 
tend to design trials differently from disinterested academics in a way 
 22 Some commentators contend that Bodenheimer may “overstate his point,” in-
sofar as industry has been designing its own protocols since the 1950s.  Author’s Per-
sonal Communication with Peter Hutt, Nov. 2005.  The extent to which pharmaceu-
tical companies have acquired more control over designing trials, however, is largely 
irrelevant to the point this section attempts to make.  Whether industry is new to the 
game or not, no one disputes that firms today play an integral role in trial design. 
 23 Bodenheimer, supra note 21, at 1540. 
 24 COMMONWEALTH FUND, FROM BENCH TO BEDSIDE: PRESERVING THE RESEARCH 
MISSION OF ACADEMIC HEALTH CENTERS 31 (1999); Bodenheimer, supra note 21, at 
1540; Lisa Henderson, The Ups and Downs of SMO Usage, CENTERWATCH MONTHLY 
NEWSLETTER, May 1999, at 4–8; Regina E. Herzlinger, Schering-Plough and Genome 
Therapeutics: Discovering an Asthma Gene (Harv. Bus. Sch. Case No. 9-303-044, Aug. 27, 
2004). 
 25 Bodenheimer, supra note 21, at 1540–41 (“In-house control is more likely in 
the commercial sector than in the academic sector, because of the limited expertise 
of many community-physician investigators.”). 
 26 Id. at 1541.  Once again, some commentators argue that Bodenheimer may 
“overstate his point.”  See supra note 22.  Regardless of whether the details of Boden-
heimer’s writing are accurate, the fact that industry often exerts significant influence 
over trial design remains largely undisputed. 
 27 See, e.g., Bodil Als-Nielsen et al., Association of Funding and Conclusions in Ran-
domized Drug Trials: A Reflection of Treatment Effect or Adverse Events, 290 JAMA 921, 
925–26 (2003); Lexchin et al., Industry Sponsorship, supra note 16, at 1170. 
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that renders favorable results more probable.  This is true for three 
reasons. 
First, the methodology used to determine the quality of the re-
search methods does not preclude the possibility of bias.28  The thir-
teen studies that found that the research methods of industry-
sponsored trials were at least as good as those in publicly-financed tri-
als utilized relatively crude mechanisms for evaluating quality.29  The 
instruments used to test the methodological quality of clinical trials 
generally seek to determine only whether “systematic bias” has been 
minimized,30 where systematic bias is defined as “anything that erro-
neously influences the conclusions about groups and distorts com-
parisons.”31  In other words, the quality-measuring instruments de-
termine whether the statistical analyses were performed correctly and 
whether the experimental and control groups were identical in every 
respect, except for the particular difference being examined.32  They 
do not, however, provide insight into whether the trial’s time frame 
was optimal for detecting adverse side effects, the subjects were rep-
resentative of the patient population likely to be treated with the 
medication, or inappropriate dosages were used to make the drug in 
question appear more effective.33
In essence, the difference is one between trials that are method-
ologically flawed and those that are methodologically suboptimal.  
Flawed trials produce results that are scientifically invalid.  Once it 
has been shown that investigators assigned subjects to comparison 
groups in a nonrandom manner, investigators and/or patients were 
unmasked, or the statistical analyses were corrupted, one can objec-
tively say that the data are less reliable than that which would be pro-
duced by unflawed research methods.  A methodologically subopti-
 28 Lexchin et al.’s meta-analysis admits this: “[T]he methodology used to deter-
mine the quality of research methods does not guarantee the absence of bias in stud-
ies sponsored by industry since outcome could be influenced by factors left out of 
quality scores, such as the question asked or the conduct or reporting of the study.”   
Lexchin et al., Industry Sponsorship, supra note 16, at 1170. 
 29 See id. at 1168. 
 30 Mildred K. Cho & Lisa A. Bero, The Quality of Drug Studies Published in Sympo-
sium Proceedings, 124 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 485, 486 (1996). 
 31 Trisha Greenhalgh, How to Read a Paper: Assessing the Methodological Quality of 
Published Papers, 315 BRIT. MED. J. 305, 306 (1997). 
 32 Id.; see Tammy J. Clifford et al., Funding Source, Trial Outcome and Reporting Qual-
ity: Are They Related? Results of a Pilot Study, 2 BMC HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH 18 
(2002) (describing the Jadad scale, the most commonly used instrument for measur-
ing methodological quality), http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/2/18. 
 33 See infra Part III.E (discussing the myriad ways in which pharmaceutical spon-
sors may design trials in ways that are not ideal for testing the effectiveness or safety 
of the drug but are more likely to yield favorable results). 
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mal trial, however, produces valid data; the trial is merely less infor-
mative to the prescribing public than the optimal trial design.  Unlike 
the case with flaws, the presence or absence of a methodologically 
suboptimal design is dependent on the cost associated with improv-
ing the trial, and is thus always open to debate.  A sponsor who fails to 
enroll subjects who are representative of the group likely to take a 
drug may have done so in order to obscure the pharmaceutical’s ef-
fect in the unrepresented group, or because the additional cost asso-
ciated with enrolling those subjects would not have been cost-
justified.34  A methodological limitation can be said to exist in the 
former situation, but not the latter. 35
The thirteen studies that applaud the sound research methods 
of industry-sponsored trials generally examined flaws, rather than 
“limitations.”36  In any of the thirteen studies, an industry-funded trial 
could receive a perfect quality score even if different research meth-
ods would have been more informative to prescribing physicians. 
Second, the studies analyzing the methodological quality of 
clinical trials fail to look at the difference between trials where the 
protocol was designed by pharmaceutical companies, and trials where 
disinterested academics had full control over trial design; they in-
stead focus on the source of funding.  One cannot assume that the 
protocols of all industry-funded trials are designed by industry while 
disinterested parties always design publicly-financed studies.37  The 
 34 There are many valid reasons for excluding particular subjects from a clinical 
trial.  Enrichment trials, for example, enroll only those patients who are likely to 
benefit from a drug.  Including subjects who are known not to benefit from the 
compound would not only be economically unsound, but unethical as well.  My point 
is simply that some reasons for excluding particular types of subjects are improper, 
namely if the exclusion occurs in order to obscure the pharmaceutical’s effect on the 
omitted group.  The temptation to engage in such a practice exists only when a drug 
has already been approved by the FDA for the population excluded from the study, 
indicating that the compound does benefit these patients to some extent and there-
fore an enrichment trial would be inappropriate.  See infra Part III.E.iii, viii.  In es-
sence, any time a drug works better in group A than in group B, but still met the re-
quired efficacy and safety thresholds to receive FDA approval in group B, the sponsor 
has an incentive to design a post-marketing study that enrolls a disproportionate 
number of people from group A.  
 35 As this paragraph suggests, all flawed trials are suboptimal by definition, but 
suboptimal trials are not always flawed. 
 36 I use the word “limitations” to signify a trial with suboptimal but unflawed re-
search methods.  Some of the thirteen studies do include methodological limitations 
in their analysis, but for the most part, the focus here is on methodological flaws.  
 37 See Caitlin R. Reed & Carlos A. Camargo, Recent Trends and Controversies in In-
dustry-sponsored Clinical Trials, 6 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 833, 855 (1999) (discussing 
the difference between industry-sponsored research and industry-initiated research, 
where company scientists “develop the idea, design the study, and write the proto-
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correlation between industry sponsorship and unencumbered indus-
try design may be imperfect enough to obscure a correlation between 
industry design and bias. 
Finally, the thirteen studies concluding that industry-sponsored 
research methods are at least as sound as those designed by non-
industry representatives fail to isolate post-approval (phase IV) clini-
cal trials for analysis.  Pharmaceutical companies have little incentive 
to design suboptimal protocols for phase I, II, and III trials since the 
FDA is privy to the research methods and results of all such trials 
when evaluating products for approval.38  The submission of research 
data from methodologically suboptimal trials would reduce a com-
pany’s chances of obtaining approval for all desired conditions and 
subpopulations.39  It may make sense, however, for a drug company to 
col”).  The pervasiveness of academic researchers with financial ties to pharmaceuti-
cal companies makes it likely that someone who has a monetary stake in the outcome 
will design a publicly funded trial.  See Marcia Angell, Is Academic Medicine for Sale?, 
342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1516, 1516–18 (2000) (offering an excellent discussion of the 
ubiquity of financial conflicts of interest); see generally JEROME P. KASSIRER, ON THE 
TAKE (2005).  Furthermore, even if the trial designer remains financially non-
conflicted, she may have an incentive to achieve favorable results since doing so will 
make the study more publishable and hence more valuable to her curriculum vitae. 
 38 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA New Drug Application (NDA) Process 
http://www.fda.gov/CDER/regulatory/applications/nda.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 
2007); Oxigene Clinical Trial Patient Inquiries, http://www.oxigene.com/ 
prodDel.asp?sf=t (last visited Oct. 7, 2007). 
 39 In theory, there may be two circumstances where it would be in a firm’s best 
interest to design suboptimal phase I, II or III trials that are more likely to yield fa-
vorable results.  First, if the company could craft a protocol that interjects bias so sub-
tle that the FDA cannot recognize it, the firm would profit from doing so.  Second, if 
the company were certain that it will get approval for all desired conditions and sub-
populations because of clear and convincing data, it could conduct methodologically 
suboptimal trials on other conditions and/or sub-populations for which it had no 
chance of obtaining approval.  If clear and convincing data virtually ensured FDA 
approval for all desired conditions and subpopulations, the firm might even try to 
generate studies that inflate the effectiveness and/or safety of the drug, so that these 
studies can be used in its marketing efforts (e.g., by sales representatives).  For in-
stance, if the sponsoring firm knew that the only way it could obtain significant mar-
ket share was to beat out a competitor, it might have an incentive to conduct perfect 
placebo-controlled studies but suboptimal head-to-head studies with the competition.  
AstraZeneca appears to have done this with Nexium since it knew that a substantial 
share of the market was unattainable unless it demonstrated that Nexium offered ad-
vantages over generic Prilosec—the company designed trials that used higher doses 
of Nexium than Prilosec, thereby making it look as if Nexium was more effective at 
treating heartburn.  See infra Part III.E.v.c (discussing pharmaceutical companies’ po-
tential incentives to manipulate the dosing in industry-sponsored studies in order to 
achieve favorable results); see also ANGELL, THE TRUTH, supra note 21, at 76–79 (dis-
cussing in greater detail the events that led up to the poorly designed Nexium trials).  
The results of these suboptimal studies would have no effect on the FDA’s decision 
since the company will conduct enough methodologically sound studies to obtain 
approval for all desired conditions and subpopulations, but can be used to influence 
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design a suboptimal phase IV protocol if (a) the post-marketing study 
is not required by the FDA,40 and (b) the sponsoring firm has no in-
tentions of seeking a label change from the FDA.41  The results of 
such a study can be published in journals and used by sales represen-
tatives to influence physicians’ prescribing habits.  So long as the 
methodology of the study is not flawed, but merely suboptimal, com-
panies should have no trouble publishing the results.42  After all, a 
suboptimal but unflawed study still presents statistically sound data.43
D. Building on the Work of Bero and Rennie: What this Article Adds 
to the Literature 
Bero and Rennie published an article in 1996 that discussed the 
primary areas where bias might enter into the design, conduct or 
publication of a clinical trial.44  Despite the fact that their paper has 
been consistently lauded,45 little has been done to update or expand 
upon the research.  This Article purports to build on Bero and Ren-
nie’s work in seven ways.  First, it documents recent examples of in-
dustry-funded, methodologically suboptimal, published trials.  Sec-
ond, it broadens some of the categories of methodological limitations 
so that problems in future trials can be more easily recognized.  
Third, by subdividing the categories of suboptimal designs, this Arti-
cle fleshes out several mechanisms through which methodological 
limitations may be introduced into a trial.  Fourth, it identifies meth-
odological limitations not discussed by Bero and Rennie.  Fifth, this 
Article presents suggestions for further research that could empiri-
prescribing habits (e.g., convince doctors to prescribe the drug for off-label uses).  In 
essence, such a trial would be a phase IV trial with a “head start” since its purpose 
would be the same as a phase IV study but the data would be available immediately 
after FDA approval. 
 40 The FDA exerts significant influence over the design of required post-marketing 
studies.  U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Post-Marketing Commitments, 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/pmc/default.htm. 
 41 The FDA’s decision whether or not to grant a request to change the drug’s la-
bel would undoubtedly consider the soundness of the post-marketing studies’ meth-
odology.   
 42 See infra Part III.E (providing a plethora of examples where prestigious medical 
journals published methodologically suboptimal, and in some cases flawed, trials). 
 43 Lexchin et al. demonstrate that this is the case when they state that the re-
search methods of industry-sponsored studies are at least as high quality as those of 
publicly-funded trials, since the level of “systematic bias” is no greater in the former 
than in the latter.  Lexchin et al., Industry Sponsorship, supra note 16, at 1170; see supra 
notes 31–32 and accompanying text (offering a definition of “systematic bias”). 
 44 Bero & Rennie, supra note 14, at 228–29. 
 45 JOHN ABRAMSON, OVERDOSED AMERICA 227 (2004); Bodenheimer, supra note 21, 
at 1541 . 
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cally determine whether the pharmaceutical industry is in fact inten-
tionally designing suboptimal protocols that are more likely to yield 
favorable results.  Sixth, it demonstrates why, under the current le-
gal/regulatory regime, the FDA, providers, payers, journal editors 
and the tort system are unable to eliminate methodological limita-
tions in clinical trials.  Finally, after examining proposals from other 
authors, this Article offers a novel solution for curbing industry’s in-
centive to create suboptimal protocols.46
E. Targeted Clinical Trials: Examples of Suboptimal Research Methods 
(i) Introduction 
The focus of this Article is on theory, not practice.  This section 
discusses the many ways in which pharmaceutical companies may have 
an incentive to conduct methodologically suboptimal trials, providing 
examples of such studies merely as illustrations, rather than proof of 
intentional bias within industry-funded endeavors.  Since no study 
has been conducted that proves or disproves the theory that drug 
companies intentionally design suboptimal protocols that are more 
likely to produce positive results, any discussion of actual instances 
where the results of methodologically suboptimal trials were pub-
lished can be nothing more than anecdotal.  Nevertheless, as this Ar-
ticle’s discussion of the fundamental attribution error demonstrates, 
what matters most is not whether one can prove that commercially 
designed trials are statistically more likely to contain methodological 
limitations than protocols created without industry influence, but 
whether pharmaceutical companies are sometimes given an incentive 
to utilize suboptimal research methods.47  A system that forces indus-
try sponsors to choose between their legal obligation to maximize 
shareholder wealth and serving the public health through the design 
of maximally informative clinical trials is misguided, regardless of 
whether pharmaceutical companies are consistently choosing to 
honor their fiduciary duty to shareholders.  In this very important 
sense, the theoretical is much more potent than the actual.  Under-
 46 This Article also differs from the work of Bero and Rennie insofar as it focuses 
on methodological limitations, omitting any discussion of methodological flaws or 
issues surrounding the publication of trial results.  I focus on methodological limita-
tions, rather than flaws, for two principal reasons.  First, some limit was needed in 
order to keep the scope of this Article manageable.  Second, and more importantly, 
limitations are more difficult to prevent than flaws since the latter can be unambigu-
ously identified by physicians, insurers and journal editors, while the existence of the 
former is dependent on the sponsor’s cost structure and therefore open to debate. 
 47 See supra Part II (discussing the fundamental attribution error). 
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standing the potential conflicts of interest in the design of clinical tri-
als—what this Article purports to articulate—is far more important 
than determining how pharmaceutical companies tend to resolve 
those conflicts. 
Many of the examples of suboptimal designs are presented hypo-
thetically.  This is done primarily because of the difficulty associated 
with combing the medical literature and identifying improperly tar-
geted research.  As discussed in Part III.C, the presence or absence of 
a methodological limitation is dependent on the cost associated with 
improving the trial, and is thus always open to debate.  A protocol is 
suboptimal if and only if the benefits associated with the absent data 
outweigh the cost of making the results more informative to the pre-
scribing public.  Since it is difficult (if not impossible) for journal edi-
tors to determine whether a targeted trial is indicative of suboptimally 
informative research methods or a cost-justified limitation that serves 
the public health,48 it would have been impossible to do so in this Ar-
ticle49  In any event, as there is no evidence that industry acts on the 
perverse incentives described in this Article, real world examples may 
not exist for all categories of methodological limitations. 
Several of the hypothetical examples of suboptimal trial designs 
are created from real world examples of egregious errors in report-
ing.  Such fraudulent reporting tends to highlight the perverse incen-
tives that future trial designers are likely to face.  For instance, the 
CLASS study discussed in Parts III.E.ii.a and III.E.iv.c failed to include 
data collected during the second six months of the trial.  If the data 
were sufficiently damning to spur outright fraud, one would think 
that future designers of voluntary, non-label-seeking, post-approval 
studies would attempt to avoid the collection of such data altogether 
by conducting an unduly short trial.50
Finally, it is important to reiterate that this Article addresses only 
voluntary post-approval trials not intended to support supplemental 
New Drug Application (NDA) labeling changes.  The perverse incen-
tives discussed below likely do not exist for other types of studies. 
 48 See infra Part IV.A.v (discussing why journal editors are unable to curb indus-
try’s incentive to design targeted trials that do not serve the public health). 
 49 See infra Part III.E.vii (discussing other reasons, besides cost, why it may be dif-
ficult to identify the existence of suboptimal methodology). 
 50 See infra Part III.E.ii.a. 
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(ii) Time Frame: Conducting a Trial that Does Not Last 
Long Enough 
Pharmaceutical companies may have an incentive to conduct 
studies that are unduly short.  By terminating a trial earlier than is 
best for the medical community, industry sponsors may be able to 
limit the occurrence of adverse side effects and/or enhance per-
ceived effectiveness. 
(a) Limiting the Occurrence of Adverse Side Effects 
Adverse side effects associated with pharmaceuticals often arise 
only after the patient has been taking the medication for an extended 
period of time.51  This is frequently true even in cases where the com-
pound’s desired therapeutic effects appear immediately after admini-
stration of the first dose.52  Pharmaceutical companies may therefore 
have an incentive to design a protocol that lasts long enough to dem-
onstrate the desired efficacy but not long enough to reveal the ad-
verse effects associated with the compound.53  In some cases, a study 
may be done that is designed to measure adverse effects only, leaving 
efficacy to be determined by other trials.54  In such a case, an industry 
sponsor may have an incentive to run a study that ends just before 
one would expect to begin seeing adverse side effects. 
The September 13, 2000 issue of the Journal of the American 
Medical Association (JAMA) published the results of the CLASS 
study, a phase IV trial that compared the risk of gastrointestinal prob-
lems in people taking Celebrex with the risk in those taking ibupro-
fen and diclofenac.55  The published results of the CLASS study have 
 51 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Cnter for Drug Evaluation and Research, Clinical 
Therapeutics and the Recognition of Drug-Induced Disease, A MedWatch Continuing Educa-
tion Article, June 1995, at 1, available at http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/articles/ 
dig/ceart.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2007). 
 52 Id. at 2. 
 53 Generally speaking, only after a drug has become a blockbuster can a company 
afford to run a long-term trial with enough subjects to identify a rare side effect with 
statistical significance.  Such cost considerations are clearly valid concerns that 
should affect the scope of clinical studies.  A problem arises not when a sponsoring 
firm forgoes a fishing expedition for a rare side effect, but rather when it knowingly 
shortens a trial because of evidence suggesting that side effects are likely to become 
increasingly prevalent as time passes. 
 54 See Bero & Rennie, supra note 14, at 212–13 (discussing the tendency to define 
research questions too narrowly so that efficacy and safety are not proven in the same 
study). 
 55 Fred E. Silverstein et al., Gastrointestinal Toxicity with Celecoxib vs. Nonsteroidal 
Anti-inflammatory Drugs for Osteoarthritis and Rheumatoid Arthritis: The CLASS Study: A 
Randomized Controlled Trial, 284 JAMA 1247 (2000). 
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been extensively criticized for failing to disclose pertinent informa-
tion about the trial.56  Although the study was run for a full twelve 
months, the authors submitted data from only the first six months for 
the article in JAMA.57  The authors failed to report that, during the 
second six months of the study, “six of the seven serious gastrointes-
tinal complications that occurred were in patients taking Celebrex.”58
For purposes of this paper, the important point is not that 
Pharmacia, the maker of Celebrex, concealed data, but rather that 
future industry representatives designing trials for Cox-2 Inhibitors or 
similar compounds may be wary of recording data on gastrointestinal 
complications for more than six months. 59  If, prior to conducting 
the CLASS study, Pharmacia had any indication that gastrointestinal 
problems were far more likely to occur after six months of use, the 
company would have had an incentive to limit the phase IV study to a 
six-month time frame.60  Alternatively, if Pharmacia had not con-
cealed the data, it could have run a subsequent six-month study in an 
effort to control some of the damage.61
 56 ABRAMSON, supra note 45, at 29–33 (providing an excellent, easy to understand 
account of the issues surrounding JAMA’s presentation of the CLASS study); ANGELL, 
THE TRUTH, supra note 21, at 108–109; Greider, supra note 7, at 102. 
 57  ABRAMSON, supra note 45, at 29; Susan Okie, Missing Data on Celebrex Full Study 
Altered Picture of Drug, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2001, at A11. 
 58 ABRAMSON, supra note 45, at 29; Okie, supra note 57. 
 59 Celebrex is a Cox-2 inhibitor. 
 60 One could argue that required phase IV studies provide an adequate check 
against the interjection of such bias, insofar as the FDA would never have approved 
Celebrex without a promise by Pharmacia to measure gastrointestinal side effects for 
at least twelve months.  Such an argument, however, ignores the reality that pharma-
ceutical companies routinely fail to conduct FDA-mandated post-approval trials.  See 
FDA Requested Postmarketing Studies in 73% of Recent New Drug Approvals, TUFTS CENTER 
FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEVELOPMENT IMPACT REPORT, Jul.–Aug. 2004, at 1–4 (K.I. 
Kaitin, ed.) (stating that the completion rate for required post-marketing studies 
from 1998–2003 was twenty-four percent). 
 61 In this particular case, it might not be profitable for Pharmacia to conduct a 
second study since doing so would be costly and the financial return associated with 
the damage control would be dubious.  The prevalence of gastrointestinal problems 
was so much higher during the second six months of the CLASS study than the first 
six months that many doctors would likely recognize the bias inherent in the second, 
purposefully shortened trial.  In another case, however, where there is not such a 
large discrepancy in the adverse effects between the early and late stages of the initial 
trial, it might make financial sense for a company to conduct a second, methodologi-
cally suboptimal study.  Without the precipitous increase in complications seen in the 
CLASS study, more doctors might fail to recognize the methodological limitation of 
the second trial. 
FALIT_FINAL 10/18/2007  8:47:37 AM 
986 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:969 
 
(b) Enhancing Perceived Effectiveness 
In addition to limiting the occurrence of adverse effects, short-
ening the length of a study may enhance perceived effectiveness.  A 
drug may be excellent at treating the symptoms of a chronic disease 
for a short period of time, but not nearly as efficacious over the long 
run as the patient becomes habituated to the medication.  Studies 
purporting to test the effectiveness of Selective Serotonin Reuptake 
Inhibitors (SSRIs) at treating depression have been criticized for be-
ing too short.62  Since SSRIs become less effective over time63 and, 
even in studies of just four to eight weeks, the drug typically fails to 
statistically outperform a placebo or outperforms it by a very small 
margin,64 it would seem that pharmaceutical companies have an in-
centive to design voluntary, non-label-seeking, post-approval studies 
that are as short as possible.65
(c) Identifying the Presence of a Problem 
The solution to the problem of unduly short trials is not to man-
date lengthier studies across the board, but rather to realign the in-
centives of trial designers with the public health.  A blanket require-
ment to extend studies would increase the cost of each trial, thereby 
reducing the amount of money left in the sponsor’s research and de-
 62 See, e.g., JOSEPH GLENMULLEN, PROZAC BACKLASH: OVERCOMING THE DANGERS OF 
PROZAC, ZOLOFT, PAXIL AND OTHER ANTIDEPRESSANTS WITH SAFE, EFFECTIVE 
ALTERNATIVES 205 (2000). 
 63 See Tony Kendrick, Prescribing Antidepressants in General Practice, 313 BRIT. MED. 
J. 829 (1996); see also Duncan B. Double, Letter, Prescribing antidepressants in general 
practice, 314 BRIT. MED. J. 826, 826 (1997). 
 64 GLENMULLEN, supra note 62, at 207.  This point should not be taken as evi-
dence that SSRIs are worthless drugs that offer marginal benefits in all cases.  To the 
contrary, it is likely that SSRIs are quite effective in some cases and wholly ineffective 
in others but current science is unable to adequately screen out those patients who 
do not respond favorably to the medication.  Nevertheless, since there is no way to 
screen out the non-responders, clinical trial designers are left with a high hurdle 
(proof of effectiveness) and limited power with which to clear that hurdle (the re-
sponders must exhibit greater levels of effectiveness than would be necessary if non-
responders could be systematically removed from the study).  Thus, industry spon-
sors have an incentive to recruit hurdle-clearing power by shortening the length of 
the trials. 
 65 This argument does not suggest that sponsors always have an incentive to de-
sign unduly short trials.  Such an incentive only exists when there is some evidence to 
suggest that the compound’s effectiveness will decline with time (or adverse side ef-
fects will become more prevalent).  Indeed, if there is good evidence to suggest that 
the drug’s long-term safety and effectiveness profile will mirror its short-term profile 
(as is the case with statins), industry sponsors have a financial incentive to conduct a 
longer study that proves this point. 
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velopment budget to examine other drugs.66  Firms must be given in-
centives to design trials that are optimal in length, insofar as shorter 
studies would fail to produce enough data about the drug’s safety and 
effectiveness, while the additional funding needed for longer studies 
could be put to better use in the administration of other trials. 
(iii) Inappropriate Subjects: The Use of Patients Who Are 
Less Likely to Experience Adverse Side Effects and/or 
More Likely to Demonstrate Efficacy 
Pharmaceutical companies may have an incentive to improperly 
enroll a study population that is unrepresentative of the patients tak-
ing the medication, but for which success (low adverse side effects 
and/or high efficacy) is likely.67  Any time a drug works better in 
group A than group B, but still meets the required efficacy and safety 
thresholds to receive FDA approval in group B, the manufacturer 
may have an incentive to design trials that enroll a disproportionate 
number of subjects from group A. Of course, there are numerous 
valid reasons for excluding subpopulations from a trial.  For instance, 
there may be evidence that the drug is ineffective for a certain group.  
In such a case, including the subpopulation for which the drug would 
have no effect would not only be economically unsound, but unethi-
cal as well.  This section focuses exclusively on situations in which in-
dustry sponsors may have an improper incentive to exclude certain 
patients from a trial—i.e., where the patient population is narrowed 
in order to obscure the pharmaceutical’s effect on the excluded 
group.68  In essence, when past studies have demonstrated that a drug 
is safer and/or more effective in group A than in group B, but still 
sufficiently safe and effective in group B to have received FDA ap-
proval, the sponsor may have an incentive to conduct a “quasi-
enrichment trial.”  An economically rational sponsor will attempt to 
enroll as many patients from group A as possible (getting as close to a 
full enrichment trial as possible) without going so far as to prompt 
complaints from competitors or alert perspicacious physicians to the 
enrichment-like nature of the trial.  The percentage of patients from 
group A that a sponsor has an incentive to enroll will also turn on the 
extent to which the drug is superior for subpopulation A.  If the drug 
 66 In theory, pharmaceutical companies could continue conducting research at 
the same rate by expanding the research and development budget and raising prices, 
reducing other expenditures, or accepting lower profits. 
 67 Bero & Rennie, supra note 14, at 213. 
 68 See infra Part III.E.vii (discussing some of the valid reasons for excluding cer-
tain types of patients from clinical trials). 
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is remarkably safer and/or more effective in group A (as opposed to 
only marginally superior), physicians are more likely to notice if the 
study population has been improperly enriched with individuals from 
group A. 
(a) Age 
Industry sponsors may have an incentive to enroll patients who 
are younger than those taking the drug since favorable results are 
generally harder to obtain in elderly subjects.69  Although individuals 
sixty-five years of age and older consume approximately one-third of 
all drugs,70 they are severely underrepresented in clinical trials.71  Sen-
ior citizens are among the largest users of anti-inflammatory drugs 
and are more likely to suffer serious complications from their use.72  
Nevertheless, only 2.1 percent of patients in studies of anti-
inflammatory drugs are over the age of sixty-five.73  Although three-
fourths of the patients in a typical cancer trial are under age sixty-five, 
approximately two-thirds of all cancer patients are sixty-five or older.74  
Despite the fact that half of the men who have strokes are seventy-one 
or older while half of the women who have strokes are seventy-nine or 
older,75 a recent study examining the risk of stroke in patients taking 
Pravachol76 enrolled patients with an average age of sixty-two.77  Al-
though the study touted the effectiveness of Pravachol in lowering 
the risk of stroke, a closer analysis of the details reveals that the “pa-
tients in the study age 70 and older who had been treated with Prava-
 69 Jerry Avorn, Including Elderly People in Clinical Trials: Better Information Could Im-
prove the Effectiveness and Safety of Drug Use, 315 BRIT. MED. J. 1033, 1033–34 (1997); 
Bero & Rennie, supra note 14, at 213.  Of course, there are many valid reasons for 
excluding the elderly from clinical trials.  See infra Part III.E.vii. 
 70 Avorn, supra note 69, at 1033. 
 71 G. Bugeja et al., Exclusion of Elderly People from Clinical Research: A Descriptive 
Study of Published Reports, 315 BRIT. MED. J. 1059, 1059 (1997); Jerry H. Gurwitz et al., 
The Exclusion of the Elderly and Women from Clinical Trials in Acute Myocardial Infarction, 
268 JAMA 1417, 1417 (1992). 
 72 Paula A. Rochon et al., The Evolution of Clinical Trials:  Inclusion and Representa-
tion, 159 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 1373, 1373 (1998); see ABRAMSON, supra note 45, at 
103–04 (offering an excellent discussion of the under-representation of elderly pa-
tients in clinical trials). 
 73 Rochon et al., supra note 72, at 1373. 
 74 ABRAMSON, supra note 45, at 104. 
 75 Id. at 16. 
 76 Pravachol is the brand name of Pravastatin, a cholesterol-lowering statin drug. 
 77 Harvey D. White et al., Pravastatin Therapy and the Risk of Stroke, 343 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 317, 318 (2000). 
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chol actually had 21 percent more strokes than the patients given a 
placebo.”78
(b) Race 
In some circumstances, pharmaceutical companies may have an 
improper incentive to enroll a disproportionate number of subjects 
from a particular race.  BiDil, a medication used to treat heart failure 
in African American patients, recently became the first drug to re-
ceive FDA approval for use in a specific racial group.79  In 1999, the 
makers of BiDil attempted to obtain FDA approval for the use of the 
drug in all races, but the FDA concluded that the required efficacy 
had not been demonstrated.80  The data in the 1999 NDA suggested 
that the medication was more effective in African Americans, and 
thus the FDA advised NitroMed, the current manufacturer of the 
drug, to conduct studies on African Americans alone so that they 
could obtain race-targeted approval for BiDil.81  If BiDil had been 
barely effective enough in Caucasians to receive approval from the 
FDA in 1999 for use in all races (but still far more effective for Afri-
can Americans), NitroMed82 might have had an incentive to conduct 
voluntary, non-label-seeking phase IV studies in which the subjects 
are disproportionately African American. 
(c) Gender 
The Pravachol study discussed above provides an example of 
how industry sponsors may have a perverse incentive to enroll a dis-
proportionate number of subjects from one gender.83  Although sixty 
percent of stroke victims are women, eighty-three percent of the peo-
ple enrolled in the Pravachol study were men.84  Despite the authors’ 
praising remarks for Pravachol’s overall effectiveness, buried in the 
details of the study is the fact that the “women in the study who were 
 78 ABRAMSON, supra note 45, at 16. 
 79 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves BiDil Heart Failure Drug for Black Pa-
tients, June 23, 2005, http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2005/NEW01190.html 
(last visited Oct. 7, 2007). 
 80 Aaron Lorenzo, FDA Panel Votes 9-0 to Support BiDil’s Clearance, BIOWORLD 
TODAY, June 17, 2005, at 7. 
 81 Id. 
 82 “Medco Research” is the name of the company that submitted the NDA in 
1999.  If approval had been granted for all races in 1999, NitroMed might not have 
acquired the rights to the patent.  The name “Nitromed,” however, is used for sim-
plicity. 
 83 See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text (discussing the Pravachol study). 
 84 ABRAMSON, supra note 45 at 16; White et al., supra note 77. 
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given Pravachol experienced 26 percent more strokes than the women 
who were given a placebo.”85  Whenever a drug is safer and/or more 
effective for one gender, but still sufficiently safe and effective to have 
received FDA approval for both men and women, industry may have 
an incentive to conduct voluntary, non-label-seeking phase IV studies 
that selectively enroll one gender. 
(d) Severity of the Disease 
Designers of industry-sponsored studies may have an incentive to 
enroll subjects with mild forms of the disease in question, even 
though the drug is used regularly in patients with more serious symp-
toms.  Some have criticized antidepressant studies for excluding indi-
viduals who are severely depressed or suicidal.86
Many drugs receive FDA approval for only the mild to moderate 
form of the disease, and thus may not be marketed for more severe 
types of the illness.87  In some cases, a drug may reach the efficacy 
and safety thresholds necessary to receive FDA approval for severe 
forms of the disease, even though the drug is better suited for mild to 
moderate symptoms.88  In such a case, industry sponsors may have a 
financial incentive to design voluntary, non-label-seeking phase IV 
studies in which a disproportionate number of mild to moderate suf-
ferers are enrolled.  If the reverse is true, and a drug is approved for 
all forms of the disease but is safer and/or more effective in more se-
vere sufferers, firms may have an incentive to exclude individuals with 
mild symptoms from phase IV trials.89
 85 ABRAMSON, supra note 45 at 16. 
 86 See GLENMULLEN, supra note 62, at 205; see also Nat’l Inst. of Mental Health, An-
tidepressant Medications for Children and Adolescents: Information for Parents and 
Caregivers, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/healthinformation/antidepressant_child.cfm 
(last visited Oct. 7, 2007). 
 87 Consider Aricept, a medication approved to treat mild to moderate forms of 
Alzheimer’s Disease.  See Aricept (Donepezil) Shows Significant Benefits In Moderate/Severe 
Alzheimer’s Disease, DOCTOR’S GUIDE—GLOBAL EDITION, Aug. 28, 2001, http://www.psl 
group.com/dg/204B9E.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2007); see also GlaxoSmithKline, Co-
reg (carvedilol) Receives FDA Approval for Treatment of Severe Heart Failure, 
http://www.gsk.com/press_archive/press_11012001.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2007) 
(discussing Coreg, a heart failure medication originally approved for only mild to 
moderate forms of the disease but later approved to treat severe conditions). 
 88 Id. 
 89 See GlaxoSmithKline, Requip (Ropinirole HCI) Tablets First and Only Medication 
Approved by the FDA for the Treatment of Moderate-to-severe Primary Restless Leg Syndrome 
(RLS) in Adults, http://www.gsk.com/ControllerServlet?appId=4&pageId=402& 
newsid=485 (last visited Oct. 7, 2007). 
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(e) Miscellaneous 
There are an infinite number of ways in which an industry spon-
sor may possess incentives to select subjects that are not representa-
tive of the patient class receiving (or likely to receive) the drug but 
more likely to yield favorable results.  As discussed previously, any 
time a drug works better in group A than group B, but still meets the 
required efficacy and safety thresholds to receive FDA approval in 
group B, the manufacturer may have an incentive to design trials that 
enroll a disproportionate number of subjects from group A.  Phar-
maceutical companies may feel pressure to exclude from trials indi-
viduals who possess comorbidities or take other medications than the 
one being studied.90  Alternatively, they may have an incentive to pur-
posefully select subjects who are using drugs that make a favorable re-
sponse from the compound in question more likely. 
For example, consider the Vioxx Gastrointestinal Outcomes Re-
search (VIGOR) study, a post-approval trial that compared the risk of 
serious gastrointestinal problems in people treated with Vioxx against 
those treated with naproxen.91  Although only a small percentage of 
the people taking Vioxx at the time the study was conducted and 
published took steroids at the same time, over half of the people in-
cluded in the VIGOR study were taking steroids for their arthritis.92  
Notwithstanding the VIGOR study’s conclusion that Vioxx “is associ-
ated with significantly fewer clinically important upper gastrointesti-
nal events than treatment with naproxen,”93 a close analysis of the ar-
ticle reveals that the “reduction in the risk of gastrointestinal 
complications was not large enough to be statistically significant” 
among the subjects not taking steroids.94  In the Pravachol study dis-
cussed above,95 “five out of six patients in the study were taking aspi-
rin routinely,” although the vast majority of the general public does 
not.96  As in the VIGOR study, the Pravachol trial lauded the effec-
tiveness of the drug in question, glossing over the fact that, among 
the people in the study who were not taking aspirin, those taking 
 90 ABRAMSON, supra note 45, at 103–04; GLENMULLEN, supra note 62, at 205.  Quite 
often, such exclusion will be entirely appropriate.  See infra Part III.E.vii.  I speak only 
to the situation where medical knowledge would be optimized by including such pa-
tients in trials. 
 91 Claire Bombardier et al., Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib 
and Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1520 (2000). 
 92 ABRAMSON, supra note 45, at 33. 
 93 Bombardier et al., supra note 91, at 1520. 
 94 ABRAMSON, supra note 45, at 33. 
 95 White et al., supra note 77. 
 96 ABRAMSON, supra note 45, at 16. 
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Pravachol had twenty percent more strokes than those taking  
placebos.97
(f) Rebutting the Economic Argument 
Even in cases where there is no argument that the drug in ques-
tion is ineffective or harmful for the excluded group, pharmaceutical 
companies may be able to argue that the public health is served by 
removing certain patients from post-approval studies.  Utilizing a het-
erogeneous population may destroy the value of a narrowly-focused 
study, requiring additional data collection or larger samples to 
achieve the same study power.98  This may increase the cost of clinical 
trials and therefore raise the price of drugs or reduce innovation.  Al-
though such an argument has merit, it does not adequately address 
the issues discussed in this section.  This is true for two reasons. 
First, although an economic argument can be made for exclud-
ing the elderly, individuals with severe symptoms, or patients with 
comorbidities, there is generally no justification for selecting patients 
who take another drug not commonly used by the general public, or 
reason for disproportionately favoring one gender or race.99  Second, 
although in some cases, the money saved by narrowing the focus of 
the research (e.g., by excluding elderly subjects) outweighs the aug-
mentation of medical knowledge associated with having data from a 
variety of patients, this is not always true.  Often, the public health 
would be better served by spending the money needed to enroll a 
heterogeneous study population, since doing so will help prevent se-
rious adverse events in subpopulations that otherwise would have 
been underrepresented in the medical literature.100  Under the cur-
rent legal regime, firms may have an incentive to exclude patients 
from trials when their enrollment would enhance physicians’ under-
standing of the drug to an extent that makes the increased cost of the 
trial economically justifiable.  If pharmaceutical companies are going 
to continue to decide which subjects are to be enrolled in the studies 
 97 Id. 
 98 Avorn, supra note 69, at 1033. 
 99 It may make economic sense to study only one race or only one gender insofar 
as doing so helps to narrow the research question, reducing the cost per unit of sta-
tistical power. 
 100 Richard Smith, What Clinical Information Do Doctors Need?, 313 BRIT. MED. J. 1062 
(1996).  Enrolling a heterogeneous study population may be economically efficient 
even if adverse side effects are not prevented by the more diverse enrollment.  If a 
physician’s understanding of the drug’s effectiveness, safety, and/or cost-
effectiveness in the otherwise under-represented patient population is increased to 
an extent that outweighs the increased cost of the trial, then it makes economic sense 
to broaden the study population. 
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they sponsor, society has a duty to ensure that the interests of indus-
try representatives are adequately aligned with the public health. 
(iv) Inappropriate Measures of Efficacy and Safety 
Pharmaceutical companies may have an incentive to design trials 
so that a drug’s efficacy and/or safety is measured in ways that fail to 
maximally advance physicians’ knowledge of the medication, but are 
more likely to yield favorable results.101
(a) Measuring Surrogate End Points Rather Than Clinical 
Outcomes 
When determining a drug’s effectiveness, trials will ideally use 
primary endpoints, clinically relevant events of which a patient is 
aware and wants to avoid.102  For example, a study of a medication 
used to treat heart disease might test whether users of the drug ex-
perience a lower incidence of cardiac death than those taking place-
bos.  Intermediate or surrogate endpoints are outcomes that, in and 
of themselves, are meaningless to the patient since their only value 
lies in their correlation with primary endpoints.103  Examples of sur-
rogate endpoints are the level of cholesterol in the blood or one’s 
blood pressure, since patients are interested in such measures only 
because of their correlation with overall cardiac health.  It is rational 
and reasonable for study designers to use surrogate endpoints when 
primary outcomes are too difficult and/or expensive to measure rou-
tinely, and when the surrogate endpoint is sufficiently well-correlated 
with the primary outcome.104
Industry-sponsored studies, however, may have an incentive to 
use surrogate outcomes even when primary endpoints are easily 
measurable and/or the surrogate outcome is only loosely correlated 
with the endpoint of true clinical significance.105  If a drug is more ef-
fective at inducing or preventing a surrogate outcome than the pri-
mary endpoint for which it received FDA approval, pharmaceutical 
 101 Bero & Rennie, supra note 14, at 219.  Bero and Rennie discuss how bias may 
be introduced by measuring too many outcomes, so that some outcomes appear sta-
tistically significant just by chance.  As such bias would result in statistically invalid 
data, it is an example of a methodological flaw, rather than a limitation.  A discussion 
of this topic is therefore beyond the scope of this Article. 
 102 Eva Lonn, The Use of Surrogate Endpoints in Clinical Trials: Focus on Clinical Trials 
in Cardiovascular Diseases, 10 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG SAFETY 497, 498 (2001). 
 103 Id. 
 104 Susan S. Ellenberg & J. M. Hamilton, Surrogate Endpoints in Clinical Trials:  Oph-
thalmologic Disorders, 8 STAT. MED. 427, 430 (1989). 
 105 Bero & Rennie, supra note 14, at 219. 
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companies may have an incentive to conduct voluntary, non-label-
seeking, post-marketing studies that utilize the surrogate endpoint as 
the outcome of interest.106  This may be true regardless of how easy or 
inexpensive it is to test a more clinically relevant outcome, or how 
poorly correlated the surrogate endpoint is with the primary end-
point. 
An example of such perverse incentives may be found with many 
new osteoporosis drugs.107  Although post-menopausal women pri-
marily lose trabecular bone (the internal, lattice-like bone), osteopo-
rosis medications are most effective at generating cortical bone (the 
hard, dense, outer layer).108  The additional cortical bone increases 
patients’ scores on bone density tests but does not necessarily reduce 
the incidence of fractures.109  Clinical trials designed to evaluate the 
effectiveness of osteoporosis drugs often use bone density tests as a 
surrogate endpoint, even though there may be a very poor correla-
tion between one’s score on a bone density test and the prevention of 
fractures.110
 106 FDA approval may be granted on the basis of research using surrogate end-
points alone, but the reviewers must feel confident that the surrogate outcome was 
used justifiably insofar as the relationship between the two endpoints has been suffi-
ciently proven and/or the primary endpoint is too difficult and/or costly to measure 
directly.  See Robert Temple, Are Surrogate Markers Adequate to Assess Cardiovascular Dis-
ease Drugs?, 282 JAMA 790, 791–92 (1999) (discussing the issues surrounding FDA 
approval of drugs tested solely or primarily with surrogate endpoints). 
 107 See ABRAMSON, supra note 45, at 210–20. 
 108 Id. at 216. 
 109 Id. at 216–217. 
 110 See Carolyn J. Green et al., Informing, Advising or Persuading? An Assessment of 
Bone Mineral Density Testing Information from Consumer Health Web Sites, 20 INT’L J. 
TECH. ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE 1 (2004); Michael R. McClung et al., Effect of Risedro-
nate on the Risk of Hip Fracture in Elderly Women, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 333, 333 (2001) 
(stating in article abstract that “[r]isedronate increases bone mineral density in eld-
erly women, but whether it prevents hip fracture is not known.”).  The FDA takes the 
position that new osteoporosis drugs must demonstrate a reduction in fractures, as 
increased bone density is not sufficiently correlated with such a reduction.  See U.S. 
Food & Drug Admin., Guidelines for Preclinical and Clinical Evaluation Agents Used In the 
Prevention or Treatment of Postmenopausal Osteoperosis, Apr. 1994, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/osteo.pdf.  The guidelines state that: 
The most important morbid event in osteoporosis is fracture. . . . In 
epidemiologic studies, bone mineral density (BMD) has predicted the 
risk of vertebral fracture.  However, a treatment related increase in 
BMD cannot be assumed to result in reduced risk of fracture.  For ex-
ample, the relationship between BMD and fracture risk has been vali-
dated only for patients receiving estrogens, and does not apply to pa-
tients receiving fluoride. 
Id. 
     Of course, if physicians were always aware of the tenuous correlation between 
bone mineral density and protection against fractures, little harm could come from 
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(b) Custom-tailoring Measures of Effectiveness to the Drug 
in Question 
 Syndromes are clusters of symptoms that typically occur to-
gether and are thus presumed to be related.111  In contrast with a dis-
ease like diabetes or cancer, the only way to tell if a patient suffers 
from a particular syndrome is to compare her symptoms with those 
typically reported by an afflicted individual; medical tests (e.g., x-rays, 
CAT scans) are not capable of confirming the presence or absence of 
a syndrome.112  When designing voluntary, non-label-seeking, phase 
IV studies to determine a drug’s effectiveness in the treatment of a 
syndrome, pharmaceutical companies may have an incentive to focus 
on the symptoms that the company believes are most likely to re-
spond to the medication.  For instance, suppose a syndrome is char-
acterized by symptoms A through F, and the industry sponsor knows 
for certain that the drug in question significantly ameliorates symp-
toms A through C, but is less confident of the medication’s effect on 
symptoms D through F because the compound’s effect on these 
symptoms was barely sufficient to obtain FDA approval in the first 
place.  In such a case, the firm may feel pressure to design a trial that 
puts more emphasis on symptoms A through C when measuring the 
extent to which subjects suffer from the syndrome.113  The degree to 
which trial designers have an incentive to unduly focus on symptoms 
A through C will likely turn on the extent to which the drug is supe-
rior for these symptoms.  If the drug is remarkably less effective for 
symptoms D through F (as opposed to only marginally inferior), phy-
sicians are more likely to notice that the measurement scale does not 
give equal weight to all symptoms. 
the use of the surrogate endpoint.  Some articles, however, are not as candid as the 
study conducted by McClung et al., insofar as the uncertain relationship between 
bone mineral density and fractures may not be expressly mentioned.  Moreover, 
when detailing physicians on post-approval trials pharmaceutical sales representatives 
typically do not provide physicians with copies of the entire study and may not dis-
cuss the correlation between the surrogate and primary endpoints. 
 111 See WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1197 (9th ed. 1986). 
 112 Inst. for the Study of Healthcare Orgs. and Trans., Psychiatric Diagnosis, 
http://www.institute-shot.com/Psychiatric%20Diagnosis.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 
2007) (including an extended draft of an article to appear in Alternatives to the DSM, a 
text published by the American Pschological Association, and edited by L. E. Beutler 
and M. L. Malik). 
 113 See Daniel J. Safer, Design and Reporting Modifications in Industry-Sponsored Com-
parative Psychopharmacology Trials, 190 J. NERV. MENT. DIS. 583, 584 (2002) (discussing 
“self-serving measurement scales” in psychopharmacological trials). 
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An example of this may be found in studies on depression, 
which, like all psychiatric diagnoses, is a syndrome.114  The degree to 
which one suffers from depression is often measured quantitatively 
using checklist rating scales such as the Zung Self-Rating Scale for pa-
tients and the Hamilton Depression Scale for technician-raters who 
interview patients.115  The scales ask patients to indicate whether they 
“get tired for no reason,” “have trouble sleeping at night,” “feel down-
hearted and blue,” etc.116  When designing non-required post-
marketing trials, pharmaceutical companies may feel pressure to em-
ploy scales that emphasize the physical symptoms of depression most 
susceptible to pharmacological intervention.117
(c) Inappropriately Broadening or Narrowing of 
Categories 
A pharmaceutical company sponsoring a voluntary, non-label-
seeking post-approval clinical trial may have an incentive to design 
the study so that the drug’s adverse side effects are categorized in a 
way that is suboptimal in terms of advancing the medical literature, 
but more likely to produce favorable results.  If the sponsor is aware 
that the drug causes side effect X, it may be reluctant to design a trial 
in which the occurrence of X in the study population is independ-
ently measured.  Instead, the company may feel pressure to use a pro-
tocol that requires clinical investigators to group together side effects 
X, Y, and Z, where X, Y and Z are related in some fashion (e.g., they 
are all cardiac side effects).  The investigators may have an incentive 
to refrain from recording data on the occurrence of individual side 
effects, only recording the frequency of X, Y and Z as a group. 
Alternatively, another drug may present a scenario in which the 
public health would be best served by aggregating several types of 
complications, but separate analyses allow the company to report 
more favorable results.  Such a situation, however, is far less problem-
atic because the data obtained from measuring the side effects sepa-
rately may be combined to produce the desired information.  When 
aggregation produces favorable results but individual analysis does 
not, it may be impossible to produce the preferred information, since 
 114 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASSOC., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS, at xxx–xxxi (Michael B. First, M.D. et al. eds., 4th ed. 2000).  
 115 GLENMULLEN, supra note 62, at 206. 
 116 Id. 
 117 GLENMULLEN, supra note 62, at 206; DAVID HEALY, THE ANTIDEPRESSANT ERA 76 
(1997). 
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data pertaining to the individual adverse effects may not have been 
recorded. 
As discussed above, the CLASS study was an FDA-mandated, 
phase IV trial that compared the risk of gastrointestinal problems in 
people taking Celebrex with the risk in those taking ibuprofen and 
diclofenac.118  The original research design, submitted to the FDA by 
Pharmacia, was lauded by the agency’s gastroenterology reviewer for 
recording and analyzing the occurrence of clinically significant (ma-
jor)119 gastrointestinal side effects separately from the incidence of 
less serious gastrointestinal problems.120  When the study was pub-
lished in JAMA, however, the incidences of clinically significant and 
minor gastrointestinal side effects were combined.121  The categories 
of adverse side effects were broadened because the original study de-
sign failed to show that Celebrex users developed significantly less 
gastrointestinal complications than users of ibuprofen or di-
clofenac.122  Statistically significant evidence to support the proposi-
tion that Celebrex is safer than other NSAIDs could be obtained only 
by aggregating the data from major and minor side effects. 
As was the case with Pharmacia’s decision to conceal the data 
from the last six months of the trial, the important point is not that 
the company distorted data and deceived the editors of JAMA.123  The 
point is that industry sponsors of future voluntary, non-label-seeking 
post-marketing trials testing the safety of Cox-2 inhibitors or similar 
compounds may have an incentive to design studies that fail to differ-
entiate between the occurrence of major and minor gastrointestinal 
complications, even though doing so would be in the best interests of 
the public health.  If, prior to conducting the CLASS study, Phar-
macia had any indication that combining the data would be vital, it 
would have had a perverse incentive to obtain FDA-approval of a 
 118 Silverstein et al., supra note 55, at 1247–50. 
 119 The term “clinically significant” generally refers to side effects that require 
hospitalization.  See ABRAMSON, supra note 45, at 31. 
 120 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Arthritis Advisory Committee, Briefing Informa-
tion: Celebrex (celecoxib), Feb. 7, 2000, at 8, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/briefing/3677b1_05_gi.pdf.  “The estab-
lishment of a CSUGIE [clinically significant upper gastrointestinal event] . . . as the 
primary endpoint with the addition of symptomatic ulcers only as a secondary end-
point is a major strength of the current study . . . .”   Id.; see ABRAMSON, supra note 45, 
at 31. 
 121 Silverstein et al., supra note 55, at 1250–54. 
 122 ABRAMSON, supra note 45, at 31.  This is true even when the last six months of 
data were excluded from the analysis.  See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text 
(discussing how Pharmacia concealed the data from the last half of the trial). 
 123 Id. 
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phase IV study that did not separately record major and minor 
events.124  In this case, data pertaining to the individual classes of side 
effects existed and thus it was possible to conclude that Celebrex’s 
claim of superior safety rested on the methodological limitation.  In 
the future, if an industry sponsor has the forethought to design a trial 
in which such data is not collected, it will be impossible for reviewers 
of the study to determine whether different research methods would 
have had an effect on the statistical significance of the results. 
(v) Inappropriate Comparators 
When conducting voluntary, non-label-seeking post-approval 
studies, pharmaceutical companies may have an incentive to use a 
control that is cheap and provides the best chance of obtaining favor-
able results, even though a different comparator would be more 
medically informative.125  Ray et al. describe an example of how NIH-
sponsored studies used appropriate comparison groups, whereas in-
dustry-funded trials of the same drugs did not.126  Lexchin et al. sug-
gest that the selection of inappropriate comparators may be a major 
reason why industry-sponsored studies are more likely to yield favor-
able results.127
(a) Placebo Control Versus Head-to-Head Trials 
A pharmaceutical company designing a voluntary, non-label-
seeking phase IV trial may have an incentive to compare their drug to 
a placebo even though it would be more beneficial to doctors if the 
study utilized standard, preexisting therapies as comparators.  In 
some cases, head-to-head trials may provide physicians with informa-
tion, which cannot be obtained from placebo-controlled studies, 
about whether the new drug is more effective and/or safer than al-
ternative treatments. 
 124 In the case of the CLASS study, it is likely that the FDA would not have ap-
proved a study that did not record data separately for major and minor events.  How-
ever, industry sponsors of future, non-required, non-label-seeking, post-approval stud-
ies may have an incentive to design such a protocol. 
 125 Bero & Rennie, supra note 14, at 216.  This methodological limitation likely 
affects trials in earlier phases as well, since the FDA considers placebo-controlled 
studies to be adequate for obtaining approval.  See 21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (2007).  In-
deed, the FDA generally demands placebo-controlled studies unless it would be un-
ethical to deprive the control population of therapy. 
 126 See Wayne A. Ray et al., Evaluating Drugs After their Approval for Clinical Use, 329 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2029, 2030 (1993).  
 127 Lexchin et al., Industry Sponsorship, supra note 16, at 1170. 
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Djulbegovic et al. evaluated the appropriateness of the compara-
tors in clinical trials and determined that industry-sponsored studies 
are more likely than publicly-funded trials to compare innovative 
treatment to either placebo or no therapy.128  Studies sponsored by 
public resources were more likely to compare the drug in question 
with alternative treatments.129
Critics of the pharmaceutical industry contend that the majority 
of compounds developed by companies are “me-too” or “follow-on” 
drugs,130 drugs that the FDA does not consider to be significant im-
provements over other therapies.  According to the critics, the firms 
avoid head-to-head trials (opting instead for placebo-controlled stud-
ies) because there is a much higher risk of obtaining damaging re-
sults when an alternative treatment is used as a comparator.131  In 
other words, the companies are relatively confident that their me-too 
drugs are more effective than placebos, and it’s not in their financial 
interest to conduct a study to determine if their drug is better than 
existing treatments. 
Some critics have gone so far as to suggest that the Food and 
Drug Administration should condition approval on the results of 
head-to-head trials proving the new drug’s superiority over other 
therapies.132  This seems rather extreme and counterproductive, since 
placebo-controlled studies are significantly cheaper than those using 
pharmacologic interventions as comparators,133 and in some cases, 
the marginal advancement in medical knowledge created by the 
head-to-head trial may not justify the decline in research that follows 
 128 Benjamin Djulbegovic et al., The Uncertainty Principle and Industry-sponsored Re-
search, 356 LANCET 635, 637 (2000). 
 129 It is true that the FDA generally requires placebo-controlled studies for phases 
I-III, but such a fact does not explain why industry sponsors are less likely to utilize 
therapeutic comparators. 
 130 See, e.g., ANGELL, THE TRUTH, supra note 21, at 74–93; Marcia Angell, The Phar-
maceutical Industry—To Whom is it Accountable?, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1902, 1903 
(2000).  
 131 Id. at 75–76. 
 132 ANGELL, THE TRUTH, supra note 21, at 240; Bero & Rennie, supra note 14, at 
229. 
 133 Placebo-controlled studies are cheaper than head-to-head studies not only be-
cause the comparison therapy costs more in the latter, but because head-to-head tri-
als require many more subjects.  See John R. Graham, Using our Heads on Head-to-Head 
Trials, FRASER FORUM, Feb. 2003, at 6, available at  http://www.fraserinstitute.org 
/Commerce.Web/product_files/Using%20our%20Heads%20on%20Head-to-
Head%20Trials-Graham.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2007). As is indicated by the FDA’s 
preference for placebo-controlled trials, it is often the case that using a placebo 
comparator is not only cheaper than using a therapeutic comparator, but scientifi-
cally superior as well. 
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from the increased cost of conducting clinical trials.  The proper ap-
proach is to align the incentives of the pharmaceutical industry with 
the public health so that non-placebo comparators are used when 
(and only when) the subsequent advancement of the medical litera-
ture outweighs the increased cost of the study. 
(b) Poorly Represented Interventions: Generics, Dietary 
Supplements and Lifestyle Modifications 
Pharmaceutical companies may have an incentive to conduct 
placebo-controlled studies when the public health would be best 
served by comparing the drug in question with inexpensive, alterna-
tive therapies such as generic drugs (alternative compounds that have 
gone off patent), dietary supplements, or lifestyle modifications.134  
Although such study design is a specific example of the problem dis-
cussed above (companies’ failure to conduct head-to-head trials), it 
deserves a category of its own since its effect on the medical literature 
and the issuance of prescriptions is especially pernicious.  In circum-
stances where the public health calls for brand name competition as a 
comparator but the industry sponsor designs a placebo-controlled 
study, physicians and insurers will still have information (albeit im-
perfect information) about both therapies.  The manufacturers of the 
brand-name competition that should have been used as the compara-
tor will conduct their own placebo-controlled trials.135  Prescribers 
and health plans attempting to determine which drugs it should 
place on formulary may be able to make a rough determination of 
the relative effectiveness and safety of the two drugs by analyzing the 
data from the placebo-controlled trials.136
When industry sponsors fail to include generics, dietary supple-
ments, or lifestyle modifications as comparators, prescribers and 
health plans generally have access to less information with which they 
can make comparisons between the drug and the omitted compara-
tor.  Although placebo-controlled trials always exist for generics, since 
 134 Bero & Rennie, supra note 14, at 217; Ray et al., supra note 126, at 2029. 
 135 Pharmaceutical companies must demonstrate that a drug is better than an ap-
propriate control (usually placebo) before they can market the drug.  See 21 C.F.R. § 
314.126 (2007).  The fact that the drug that should have been used as a comparator 
is still on patent indicates that these studies are relatively recent and generally quite 
accessible.  See infra notes 137–142 and accompanying text (discussing why the stud-
ies of generic drugs may be less accessible). 
 136 See infra Part IV.A.iv (discussing the role of health plans in preventing the use 
of suboptimal research methods). 
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such data is required by the FDA for approval,137 the information may 
be accessed less for two reasons.  First, the data pertaining to alterna-
tive, off-patent drugs is likely older and thus less likely to be available 
online.138  Second, generic drug companies spend far less on market-
ing than the manufacturers of brand-name pharmaceuticals, and thus 
physicians are less likely to think of generic alternatives.139  Unlike 
manufacturers of brand name drugs, companies producing generics 
generally do not employ pharmaceutical representatives who can 
alert physicians to the presence of data.140  Data on the effectiveness 
of dietary supplements and lifestyle modifications may not exist since 
their efficacy does not have to be proven prior to marketing.141  Even 
if data is available, the lack of marketing for such interventions may 
make physicians less likely to suggest non-pharmaceutical alterna-
tives.142
The Antihypertensive and Lipid-Lowering Treatment to Prevent 
Heart Attack Trial (ALLHAT)143 exemplifies the adverse impact of 
pharmaceutical companies’ reluctance to use generic comparators, 
that is, to use alternative, off-patent drugs as comparators.144  Al-
though private drug companies helped fund the ALLHAT study, the 
vast majority of the money came from the National Heart, Lung, and 
Blood Institute, a branch of the National Institute of Health (NIH).145  
The trial compared four types of anti-hypertensive drugs: a calcium 
channel blocker, an alpha-adrenergic blocker, an angiotensin-
 137 21 C.F.R. § 314.126.  The placebo-controlled trials referred to are those that 
the FDA required for the drug to be approved in the first place (when it was still on 
patent). 
 138 See, e.g., JAMA website, http://jama.ama-assn.org/ (full text papers are gener-
ally only available for articles published after 1998). 
 139 See Joel Lexchin, Interactions Between Doctors and Pharmaceutical Sales Representa-
tives, 8 CANADIAN J. CLIN. PHARMACOL. 64 (2001) [hereinafter Lexchin, Interactions]. 
 140 Id. 
 141 See generally Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-417 (1994).  
 142 Lexchin, Interactions, supra note 139. 
 143 The ALLHAT Officers and Coordinators for the ALLHAT Collaborative Re-
search Group, Major Outcomes in High-Risk Hypertensive Patients Randomized to Angio-
tensin-Converting Enzyme Inhibitor or Calcium Channel Blocker vs. Diuretic, 288 JAMA 2981 
(2002) [hereinafter ALLHAT Research Group]. 
 144 ANGELL, THE TRUTH, supra note 21, at 95–99; JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL 
MEDICINES 273 (2004); Laurence K. Altman, Older Way to Treat Hypertension Found Best, 
N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2002, at A1. 
 145 See Vasilios Papademetriou et al., Characteristics and Lipid Distribution of a Large, 
High-Risk, Hypertensive Population: The Lipid-Lowering Component of the Antihypertensive 
and Lipid-Lowering Treatment to Prevent Heart Attack Trial (ALLHAT), 5 J. CLINICAL 
HYPERTENSION 377 (2003); Ron Winslow & Scott Hensley, Study Questions High-Cost 
Drugs for Hypertension, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2002, at A1. 
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converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitor, and a generic diuretic that had 
been on the market for over fifty years.146  The study concluded that 
“[t]hiazide-type diuretics are superior in preventing 1 or more major 
forms of CVD [cardiovascular disease] and are less expensive . . . 
[and thus] should be preferred for first-step antihypertensive ther-
apy.”147  Prior to the study, diuretics cost about six times less than the 
next cheapest anti-hypertensive medication,148 but were used much 
less frequently than calcium channel blockers,149 alpha-adrenergic 
blockers or ACE inhibitors.150  Given the large number of Americans 
who suffer from hypertension,151 and general concern over the rising 
cost of prescription drugs,152 the public had an interest in obtaining 
the results of the ALLHAT study years earlier, when diuretics began 
to be replaced by more expensive, brand name medications.153  The 
fact that brand-name anti-hypertensive drugs were not compared with 
generic diuretics until years after they should have been, as well as 
the nature of ALLHAT’s funding, suggest that the pharmaceutical 
industry both possesses and acts on a perverse incentive to conduct 
placebo-controlled trials when the use of generic comparators would 
be more informative. 
The April 11, 2005 edition of the Archives of Internal Medicine 
published a publicly-funded meta-analysis which concluded that 
omega-3 fatty acids (present in fish oil) are more effective than three 
lipid-lowering drugs (statins, fibrates, and resins) at preventing both 
 146 ALLHAT Research Group, supra note 143, at 2981; ANGELL, THE TRUTH, supra 
note 21, at 96. 
 147 ALLHAT Research Group, supra note 143, at 2981. 
 148 Winslow & Hensley, supra note 145. 
 149 Id.  In 2002, Pfizer’s calcium channel blocker Norvasc was the fifth-best-selling 
drug in the world.  See Press Release, IMS Health, IMS Reports 8 Percent Constant 
Dollar Growth in 2002 Audited Global Pharmaceutical Sales to $400.6 Billion (Feb. 
25, 2003), available at http://www.imshealth.com/ims/portal/front/articleC/ 
0,2777,6599_3665_41336931,00.html. 
 150 Winslow & Hensley, supra note 145.  A list of the top fifty drugs used by senior 
citizens in 2001 contains Norvasc (Pfizer’s calcium channel blocker) and three 
brand-name ACE inhibitors, but does not contain any thiazide-type diuretics.  See Bit-
ter Pill: The Rising Prices of Prescription Drugs for Older Americans, FAMILIES USA, June 
2002, at 11, available at http://familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/BitterPillreport74f9.pdf 
(last visited October 7, 2007).  
 151 At least sixty-five million Americans suffer from hypertension.  See, e.g., Rob 
Stein, Number of Americans who have High Blood Pressure Up Sharply, WASH. POST, Aug. 
24, 2004, at A2. 
 152 See, e.g., Avorn, supra note 144, at 189–266. 
 153 In 1982, diuretics accounted for fifty-six percent of prescriptions written for 
high blood pressure.  See ANGELL, THE TRUTH, supra note 21, at 97.  In 1992, however, 
after calcium channel blockers and ACE inhibitors hit the market, they accounted 
for only twenty-seven percent.  Id. 
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cardiac death and death from any cause.154  Given these results, it 
would seem that pharmaceutical companies sponsoring future volun-
tary, non-label-seeking post-approval studies of lipid-lowering drugs 
may have an incentive to design placebo-controlled trials even 
though the public would be best served by comparative data on 
omega-3 fatty acids.  The article in the Archives of Internal Medicine 
concludes by suggesting that “[f]uture trials . . . explore whether n-3 
[omega-3] fatty acids in combination with statins lead to additional 
reduction in CHD [coronary heart disease] mortality, especially in 
patients with metabolic syndrome.”155  It is questionable whether in-
dustry sponsors will heed this advice, since manufacturers of statins 
have much to lose but little to gain from such studies unless they test 
healthy patients.  Currently, anywhere between twelve and fifteen mil-
lion Americans with elevated blood cholesterol take statins, and some 
experts are suggesting that it might be beneficial for individuals with 
normal serum cholesterol to take the drug.156  Neither the American 
Heart Association nor the American College of Cardiology, however, 
recommend treating low-risk patients with statins since there is not 
enough data to support it.157
In essence, statins dominate the market for the treatment of ele-
vated serum cholesterol, but have room to expand by earning sup-
port for their use as preventive medicine in healthy individuals.158  
Just as the makers of calcium channel blockers, alpha-adrenergic 
blockers and ACE inhibitors had little incentive to compare their 
drug to a diuretic when diuretics captured such a small percentage of 
the market, statin manufacturers have little incentive to alert the pub-
lic to the benefits of omega-3 fatty acids in patients with hypercholes-
terolemia.  If studies conclude that statins and fish oil together re-
duce the risk of death more than fish oil alone in patients with 
elevated serum cholesterol, it will have a negligible impact on statin 
sales, since statins are already prescribed pervasively for hypercholes-
terolemia.159  If studies conclude that statins and fish oil together are 
 154 Marco Studer et al., Effect of Different Antilipidemic Agents and Diets on Mortality: A 
Systemic Review, 165 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 725, 726–27 (2005). 
 155 Id. at 729. 
 156 Imaginis: The Women’s Health Source, Study: Discontinuing Cholesterol-Lowering 
Drugs Harmful for Hospitalized Heart Disease Patients, http://www.imaginis.com/heart-
disease/news/news6.22.02.asp (last visited Oct. 10, 2007). 
 157 Id. 
 158 Bleys W. Rose, The War on Cholesterol, HERALD TRIBUNE.COM, Aug. 25, 2005, 
http://www.newscoast.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/FP/20050809/HEALTHMA
TTERS/50808001. 
 159 Id.  Even if the addition of statins helps reduce the risk of death, it may make 
sense for physicians to prescribe fish oil alone since statins are associated with several 
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no more effective than fish oil alone at preventing death in patients 
with high cholesterol, statin manufacturers may lose market share as 
doctors begin to prescribe cheaper omega-3 supplementation instead 
of statins. 
The incentive to compare the benefits of statins and fish oil to-
gether with each product alone in healthy patients may be minimal as 
well.  Although statin manufacturers stand to increase sales if studies 
conclude that statins and fish oil together are more effective at pre-
venting cardiac death and/or all-case mortality in patients without 
hypercholesterolemia, opposite results have the potential to foreclose 
the market for healthy consumers.  Evidence has been mounting for 
some time that statins are a beneficial form of preventive medicine 
for low-risk patients.160  Considering the progress being made toward 
expanding the market for statins into the realm of preventive medi-
cine for healthy consumers, industry sponsors of clinical trials may 
find that the potential benefit of positive findings is small and thus do 
not outweigh the risk of adverse results.  Companies may have an in-
centive to conduct placebo-controlled studies for patients with and 
without hypercholesterolemia even though society would be best 
served by understanding how lipid-lowering drugs stack up against 
cheaper dietary supplements. 
As is the case with generic drugs and dietary supplements, 
pharmaceutical sponsors appear reluctant to design trials in which 
lifestyle modifications are used as comparators.161  Once again, the 
risk of finding out that lifestyle modifications are more effective than 
the drug in question is often too great to justify the use of head-to-
head trials.  Several studies have demonstrated that exercise training 
and smoking cessation greatly reduce the risk of adverse cardiovascu-
lar events in patients with weakened hearts.162  Nevertheless, when 
Guidant, the manufacturer of implantable defibrillators, conducted a 
phase IV trial to determine whether the prophylactic implantation of 
side effects while the only side effect of omega-3 fatty acids is an unpleasant after-
taste.  See Omega-3 Fatty Acids, Wholehealthmd.com, http://www.wholehealth 
md.com/refshelf/substances_view/1,1525,992,00.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2005); 
Schieszer, supra note 156; Statins’ Side Effects Under Fire, CBSNEWS.COM, Oct. 12, 2004, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/10/11/eveningnews/main648685.shtml 
(last visited Oct. 7, 2007). 
 160 Schieszer, supra note 156. 
 161 ABRAMSON, supra note 45, at 101. 
 162 See, e.g., Romualdo Belardinelli et. al., Randomized, Controlled Trial of Long-term 
Moderate Exercise Training in Chronic Heart Failure: Effects on Functional Capacity, Quality 
of Life, and Clinical Outcome, 99 CIRCULATION 1173, 1173 (1999); Kumanan Wilson et 
al., Effect of Smoking Cessation on Mortality after Myocardial Infarction: Meta-analysis of Co-
hort Studies, 160 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 939, 943 (2000). 
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a defibrillator in patients who have suffered a heart attack reduces 
the risk of death, no effort was made to determine whether defibrilla-
tors are more or less effective than counseling about the importance 
of exercise or smoking cessation.163  Just as fish oil and statins to-
gether may be more effective than either alone, lifestyle counseling 
along with a cardiac defibrillator may be the best therapy for heart 
attack victims.  Unfortunately, however, pharmaceutical companies 
have not been given the incentives needed to investigate the matter, 
and physicians are left in the dark.164
(c) Inappropriate Dosing 
Industry sponsors may feel pressure to manipulate the dosages 
of the test compound and non-placebo comparator in order to 
achieve more favorable results.165  When designing a voluntary, non-
label-seeking post-marketing trial to test the efficacy of a drug, phar-
maceutical companies may have an incentive to use inappropriately 
high doses for the firm’s product and/or inappropriately low doses 
for the comparator.166  A 1994 study conducted by Rochon et al. con-
cluded that forty-eight percent of industry-funded trials testing the 
effectiveness of non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) util-
ized a higher dose for the manufacturer’s drug than the compara-
tor.167  Alternatively, when a study is meant to compare the adverse 
side effects associated with the sponsor’s product with those of a 
competitor, industry sponsors may have an incentive to use low doses 
for the test compound and/or high doses for the comparator.  Safer 
reported that commercially funded trials testing the relative side ef-
fects of different psychiatric drugs tend to employ inordinately high 
 163 See Arthur J. Moss et al., Prophylactic Implantation of a Defibrillator in Patients with 
Myocardial Infarction and Reduced Ejection Fraction, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 877 (2002). 
Contra ABRAMSON, supra note 45, at 98–101 (discussing the shortcomings of the Moss 
study). 
 164 Contrary to what may be popular belief, there is significant evidence that life-
style counseling by physicians can be effective.  See, e.g., Diabetes Prevention Re-
search Group, Reduction in the Incidence of Type 2 Diabetes with Lifestyle Intervention or 
Metformin, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 393, 398 (2002); Jaakko Tuomilehto et al., Prevention 
of Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus by Changes in Lifestyle among Subjects with Impaired Glucose Tol-
erance, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1343, 1348 (2001). 
 165 Bero & Rennie, supra note 14, at 218. 
 166 “Inappropriately high dosages” signifies dosages that are higher than those 
typically prescribed to patients while “inappropriately low dosages” signify dosages 
that are lower than those typically prescribed to patients. 
 167 Paula A. Rochon et al., A Study of Manufacturer-supported Trials of Nonsteroidal 
Anti-Inflammatory Drugs in the Treatment of Arthritis, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 157, 
159 (1994). 
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dosages of competitors’ products.168  If certain routes of administra-
tion for a drug are more effective or safer than others, pharmaceuti-
cal companies may have an incentive to compare their drug to the 
less attractive version of the competitor’s product.  For example, ac-
cording to Johansen and Gotzsche, trials sponsored by manufacturers 
of fluconazole tended to compare their drug with oral, not intrave-
nous, amphotericin B since the oral version is poorly absorbed.169   
(vi) Perfect Reporting Helps but does not Solve the 
Problem 
Many of the perverse incentives discussed in Part III.E incorpo-
rate an element of inappropriate reporting as well as suboptimal trial 
design.  The harm to society caused by methodological limitations 
would be significantly mitigated if published studies made it clear 
that the trial enrolled a disproportionate number of patients from 
certain subpopulations, focused on only some of the symptoms that 
comprise a syndrome, or refrained from collecting data on particular 
adverse events.  Such disclosure, however, would not eliminate the 
problem.  Society has an interest in obtaining certain information 
about the pharmaceuticals being marketed for sale.  Suboptimal pro-
tocols deprive consumers and prescribers of this knowledge, regard-
less of whether the studies openly acknowledge that they do so.  Ade-
quate disclosure may reduce the risk that physicians will erroneously 
extrapolate data, but it does not optimally advance the scientific lit-
erature. 
(vii)  Ensuring that Limitations are Truly Limitation 
As discussed throughout this Article, it is often perfectly accept-
able (and indeed desirable) for industry trial designers to create 
shortened protocols, exclude subclasses of patients, utilize surrogate 
endpoints, refrain from conducting head-to-head trials and omit data 
on safety, effectiveness, or cost-effectiveness.  This subsection briefly 
articulates some of the valid reasons, besides cost (which is discussed in 
Part III.C) for conducting trials that may superficially appear to con-
tain methodological limitations. 
Shortened trials and studies that fail to test a compound’s safety 
or effectiveness are often socially optimal.  Suppose evidence from 
phase I–III studies is sufficient to demonstrate a drug’s long-term 
 168 Safer, supra note 112, at 583–584. 
 169 Helle Krogh Johansen & Peter C. Gotzsche, Problems in the Design and Reporting 
of Trials of Antifungal Agents Encountered During Meta-analysis, 282 JAMA 1752, 1752–53 
(1999). 
FALIT_FINAL 10/18/2007  8:47:37 AM 
2007] POST-APPROVAL TRIALS 1007 
 
safety and the manufacturer merely wants to begin examining 
whether the compound would provide an immediate cure for an-
other ailment.  In such as case, it would be proper for the firm to 
conduct a shortened trial that only examines effectiveness. 
Selectively enrolling patients from particular subpopulations is 
only problematic when it is done to obscure the pharmaceutical’s ef-
fect on the excluded group.  As discussed in Part III.E.iii, it would be 
unethical for a company not to exclude subpopulations for which 
there is evidence that the drug will be ineffective.  Furthermore, en-
richment trials are often preferred to studies that enroll all types of 
subjects because they provide better evidence of effectiveness.170  In 
many instances, it is reasonable for trial designers to exclude the eld-
erly since they disproportionately suffer from comorbid conditions 
and are thus more likely to confound results.171  And of course, there 
are often valid reasons for excluding children and women of child-
bearing age.172
As stated in Part III.E.iv.a, it is desirable for the industry to use 
surrogate endpoints when primary outcomes are too difficult and/or 
expensive to measure routinely, and when the surrogate endpoint is 
sufficiently well-correlated with the primary outcome.  Indeed, the 
FDA approves many compounds based solely on studies that make 
use of surrogate outcomes.173
Very often the public would not be best served by head-to-head 
trials.  Not only are such studies incredibly costly, but placebo-
controlled research is generally preferable for determining efficacy.174  
Indeed, placebo-controlled trials are a requirement for FDA approval 
unless such research would be unethical.  Furthermore, in many 
cases, it would be pointless to determine which of several drugs in a 
particular class is “the best.”  Physicians often report that different 
compounds in the same class work for different patients, and trial 
 170 Patrick Clinton & Jill Wechsler, Whatever Happened to Critical Path, PHARMACEU-
TICAL EXECUTIVE ONLINE, Jan. 2006, http://www.pharmexec.com/pharmexec 
/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=282481&searchString=Whatever%20Happened%20to%
20Critical%20Path  (last visited Oct. 7, 2007). 
 171 Avorn, supra note 69, at 1033. 
 172 Harriette G. C. Van Spall et al., Eligibility Criteria of Randomized Controlled Trials 
Published in High-Impact General Medical Journals: A Systematic Sampling Review, 297 
JAMA 1233, 1237–40 (2007). 
 173 See, e.g., Temple, supra note 106, at 793. 
 174 Martin R Tramèr et al., When Placebo Controlled Trials are Essential and Equiva-
lence Trials are Inadequate, 317 BRIT. MED. J. 875, 875–880 (1998) (stating in summary 
that “[i]n clinical settings where no gold standard treatment exists and where event 
rates vary widely, trial designs without placebo controls are unlikely to yield sensible  
results.”). 
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and error is currently the only method available to determine who 
will respond to what medication.175  Regardless of the results of head-
to-head studies, physicians would still have to engage in the same trial 
and error process. 
It is very difficult to identify which protocols are suboptimally 
designed and which are justifiably limited.  Any proposed solution to 
the problem of methodological limitations must be tactically de-
signed insofar as it ferrets out suboptimal research, leaving firms with 
an incentive to shorten trials, exclude patients and utilize surrogate 
outcomes when doing so is in the best interest of the public health. 
(viii) Concluding Remarks 
Under the current regulatory regime, pharmaceutical compa-
nies may have a financial incentive to design voluntary, non-label-
seeking post-marketing studies that are suboptimal in terms of in-
forming the medical community.176  This is problematic for two rea-
sons.  First, society would be better served if industry’s funding were 
allocated to more medically informative studies.  Second, suboptimal 
protocols have the potential to deceive prescribers.177  Although some 
physicians will recognize that alternative research methods would 
have been more helpful in determining the effectiveness, safety 
and/or cost-effectiveness of the drug, many will not.178  These physi-
cians, and even some who recognize the studies’ shortcomings, may 
prescribe the drug when there is a safer, more effective, or less costly 
treatment.179  Even if the FDA always required the studies necessary to 
give physicians the full picture (ensuring that they are methodologi-
cally perfect), and firms always complied without delay,180 pharma-
ceutical companies might still have an opportunity and incentive to 
 175 Joseph A. DiMasi & Cherie Paquette, The Economics of Follow-on Drug Research 
and Development: Trends in Entry Rates and the Timing of Development, 22 
PHARMACOECONOMICS 1, 11–12 (2004). 
 T176 If the company hopes to use the results of the phase IV study to gain FDA ap-
proval for another subpopulation or medical condition, then there is likely no incen-
tive to design a suboptimal protocol.  In such a case, the phase IV study would take 
on characteristics of a phase I, II, or III study since it would be conducted, at least in 
part, to obtain FDA approval.  However, pharmaceutical companies may sometimes 
have an incentive to design methodologically improper phase I, II, or III trials.  See  
supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 177 This is true even if there are no reporting errors in the studies.  Physicians may 
not take the time to read the studies carefully, relying on pharmaceutical representa-
tives to explain the details.  See Lexchin, Interactions, supra note 139, at 64. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. 
 180 As discussed, companies frequently fail to conduct FDA-mandated phase IV 
studies.  See supra note 61. 
FALIT_FINAL 10/18/2007  8:47:37 AM 
2007] POST-APPROVAL TRIALS 1009 
 
run other voluntary, non-label-seeking, methodologically suboptimal 
post-approval studies.  Many, if not most, physicians would not recall 
the details of the FDA-required studies, and certainly very few would 
take the time to compare the research methods of the methodologi-
cally perfect and suboptimal trials.181
There is no such thing as a perfectly designed clinical trial.  To 
some extent, all trials will be suboptimally informative to the prescrib-
ing public.  Nevertheless, we must strive to create a society in which 
trial designers, whether they are employed by industry, nonprofit or-
ganizations or taxpayers, have incentives (financial or otherwise) that 
are as closely aligned with the public health as possible. 
F. Suggestions for Future Research 
The focus of Part III.E was on theory, not practice.  It is presently 
unclear whether pharmaceutical companies actually act on the per-
verse incentives described above.  Future research should attempt to 
determine whether industry sponsors are indeed more likely than dis-
interested academics to design methodologically suboptimal proto-
cols.  It is important to compare data from industry-designed (as op-
posed to industry-funded) trials with those protocols created by 
entirely disinterested parties.182  One cannot assume that the proto-
cols of all commercially-financed trials are designed by industry while 
disinterested parties always design publicly-funded studies.183
Future research should keep in mind that the extent of pharma-
ceutical companies’ influence over the design of protocols proceeds 
along a continuum.184  When determining whether industry-designed 
trials are more likely to contain methodological limitations, one can-
not simply check a box for “commercially designed” or “created by a 
disinterested team of academics.”  In some cases, the pharmaceutical 
company will have some influence over the trial design without pos-
sessing unfettered discretion.185
Ideally, each trial examined should be given a score that repre-
sents the extent to which the study was designed by neutral parties or 
the sponsoring company, and investigators should determine 
 181 Lexchin, Interactions, supra note 139, at 64. 
 182 See supra note 38.  It may be impossible to find someone who is “entirely disin-
terested” since academics have an incentive to advance their careers and positive 
findings may help to do so more than negative results.  Id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 See generally Kevin. A. Schulman et. al., A National Survey of Provisions in Clinical-
Trial Agreements between Medical Schools and Industry Sponsors, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1335 (2002).   
 185 Id. 
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whether there is a correlation between this score and the extent of 
methodological bias.  Such rating, however, may be impossible in 
practice since pharmaceutical companies, academic medical centers, 
and contract research organizations (CROs) may be reluctant to di-
vulge information surrounding the process through which the final 
protocol was created.186  All parties may be hesitant to support the 
idea that they contributed to the production of suboptimal research 
by allowing an industry sponsor to retain significant control over a 
trial’s design. 
An alternative, albeit less perfect, mechanism for determining 
whether pharmaceutical companies purposefully design suboptimal 
trials may be to compare studies conducted by CROs with publicly-
financed trials run by disinterested academics.  Although administra-
tion by a CRO is an imperfect proxy for identifying protocols de-
signed with extensive industry influence, it is more perfect than in-
cluding all industry-funded trials, since academic medical centers 
conducting commercially-sponsored research may exhibit consider-
able influence over the design of a protocol.187
As discussed throughout this Article, pharmaceutical companies 
have little incentive to design suboptimal protocols for phase I, II, 
and III trials since the FDA is privy to the research methods and re-
sults of all such trials when evaluating products for approval.188  The 
submission of research data from methodologically suboptimal trials 
would reduce a company’s chances of obtaining approval for all de-
sired conditions and subpopulations.  Therefore, future studies ex-
amining industry sponsors’ ability to control clinical trial data by de-
signing suboptimal protocols should separately analyze non-required 
post-approval studies (focusing, if possible, on trials in which the 
sponsor has no intention of seeking a label change from the FDA).  
Given that there are some circumstances in which it may be in a 
company’s best interest to design suboptimal phase I, II, III, or re-
 186 The International Committee of Medical Journal Editors’ (ICMJE) uniform 
requirements for manuscripts submitted to biomedical journals states that “authors 
should describe the role of the study sponsor(s), if any, in study design.”  See Interna-
tional Committee of Medical Journal Editors—Uniform Requirements for Manu-
scripts submitted to Biomedical Journals: Writing and Editing for Biomedical Publi-
cation, updated Oct. 2004, http://www.icmje.org/.  It is questionable, however, 
whether the authors’ statements surrounding the role of the sponsor in the design of 
the protocol will be sufficient to rate trials according to the extent of commercial in-
fluence over the research methods.  See Schulman et al., supra note 184 (discussing 
academic institutions’ tendency to engage in industry-sponsored research that fails to 
adhere to ICMJE guidelines). 
 187 See Bodenheimer, supra note 21, at 1543. 
 188 See supra note 39. 
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quired phase IV studies,189 future research may want to examine trials 
in all four phases.  Investigators, however, should ensure that the 
sample of non-required (and ideally non-label-seeking) post-
marketing trials is sufficiently large to generate statistically meaning-
ful results. 
This Article focuses solely on methodological limitations, ignor-
ing entirely the issue of methodological flaws.190  Several researchers 
have raised the possibility that industry-designed studies are more 
likely to contain flaws in the research methods that not only render 
the study suboptimally informative, but question the validity of the 
data as well.191 Although Lexchin et al. suggest that the research 
methods of industry-sponsored trials contain no more flaws than the 
research methods of publicly-financed trials,192 no study has been 
done that takes into account the fact that industry-funded trials may 
be designed without significant commercial influence and the idea 
that academic researchers may not be entirely disinterested.  More-
over, no study has been conducted that separately analyzes voluntary, 
non-label-seeking, post-approval trials.  Future studies should there-
fore investigate the prevalence of both flaws and limitations in non-
mandated, non-label-seeking, phase-IV trials designed by commercial 
sponsors. 
As discussed in Part III.E.i, what matters most is not whether one 
can prove that commercially-designed trials are statistically more 
likely to contain methodological bias than protocols created without 
industry influence, but whether pharmaceutical companies are some-
times given an incentive to utilize suboptimal research methods.  One 
must keep this in mind if future research determines that industry 
sponsors are no more likely than disinterested academics to design 
inappropriately targeted protocols.  Such a determination does not 
indicate the absence of a problem; it merely suggests that pharma-
ceutical companies tend to resolve their conflicts of interest by serv-
ing the public health instead of maximizing shareholder wealth. 
 189 See supra note 40. 
 190 See supra notes 28–35 and accompanying text (discussing the difference be-
tween methodological flaws and methodological limitations). 
 191 See, e.g., Bero & Rennie, supra note 14, at 216 (discussing nonrandom alloca-
tion of treatment); id. at 218 (discussing the unblinding of study subjects and/or re-
searchers); see generally S. C. Lewis & C. P. Warlow, How to Spot Bias and Other Potential 
Problems in Randomised Controlled Trials, 75 J. NEUROL. NEUROSURG. PSYCHIATRY 181 
(2004).  
 192 Lexchin et al., Industry Sponsorship, supra note 16, at 1170.  See supra notes 28–
35 and accompanying text for a discussion of how Lexchin et al.’s article addresses 
methodological flaws but fails to address methodological limitations. 
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Furthermore, a discovery that voluntary, industry-designed, non-
label-seeking, post-approval protocols are no more likely than pub-
licly financed trials created by non-conflicted academics to contain 
bias of any sort, does not entirely preclude the possibility that phar-
maceutical companies intentionally design suboptimal studies.  It may 
be the case that all studies employ suboptimal research methods.  
This is true for two reasons.  First, many academics—even those who 
are financially disinterested—may have an incentive to design subop-
timal trials that are more likely to yield positive results, since such 
studies may be more helpful in advancing an investigator’s career.193  
Second, since pharmaceutical companies fund seventy percent of the 
clinical trials conducted in the United States,194 they may be able to 
exert significant influence over what qualifies as the “gold stan-
dard.”195  When designing a study, disinterested academics must draw 
on their collective knowledge of proper trial design, focusing specifi-
cally on the type of study and drug class at hand.  This knowledge 
base has been created from the researchers’ prior experience with 
clinical trials, of which approximately seventy percent were commer-
cially-sponsored.  It therefore seems reasonable to hypothesize that 
academics’ collective understanding of trial design, and thus their 
ability to design perfect protocols, may be somewhat compromised by 
their overexposure to industry-funded studies. 
If industry-sponsored trials indeed have a substantial effect on 
the definitions of various “gold standards” of research, it is even more 
important to align the profit incentives of commercial trial designers 
with the public health.  Protocol design is as much an art as it is a sci-
ence; there are no perfect trial designs, only those which are better or 
worse than their predecessors.196  Even if pharmaceutical companies 
are no more likely than disinterested academics to concoct loaded re-
search methods, trial designers should be given incentives to inno-
vate.  Eliminating the conflicts of interest inherent in the trial design 
process, without eradicating firms’ fiduciary obligation to sharehold-
ers, would provide pharmaceutical sponsors with profit-based motiva-
 193 Although journal editors are equally likely to publish positive and negative re-
sults, researchers tend to assume that reports of negative results will be rejected.  See 
generally Kay Dickersin et al., Publication Bias and Clinical Trials, 8 CONTROL. CLIN. 
TRIALS 343 (1987); Carin M. Olson, et. al., Publication Bias in Editorial Decision Making, 
287 JAMA 2825 (2002). 
 194 Mello et al., supra note 13, at 2202. 
 195 The term “gold standard” refers to the most respected methodology that one 
can use to answer a specific research question. 
 196 See Drummond Rennie, Thyroid Storm, 277 JAMA 1238, 1240 (1997). 
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tion to create new study designs that are more informative to the 
medical public. 
IV. SOLVING THE PROBLEM: ALIGNING THE INCENTIVES OF  
INDUSTRY SPONSORS WITH THE PUBLIC HEALTH 
A. Preexisting Checks on Commercial Power—Why the Current 
Legal/Regulatory Regime Fails to Protect the Public from 
Methodological Limitations 
Before presenting solutions designed to remove pharmaceutical 
companies’ incentives to design methodologically suboptimal trials, it 
is necessary to discuss five mechanisms within the current le-
gal/regulatory landscape that, at least in theory, have the potential to 
curb such incentives.  This section discusses the shortcomings of FDA 
oversight, physicians as informed agents, insurers’ power to make 
coverage decisions, journal editors, and the tort system, ultimately 
concluding that they are unable to rein in conflicted trial designers. 
(i) FDA Oversight—Can Government Regulators Remove 
Industry’s Incentive to Design Methodologically 
Suboptimal Trials? 
The FDA has the power under the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act to prevent the dissemination of industry documents 
that are “false or misleading in any particular.”197  Although such au-
thority suggests that the FDA has the ability to prevent pharmaceuti-
cal companies from utilizing suboptimal post-approval studies in their 
marketing efforts, regulators’ real world capacity to do so is severely 
limited.  This is true for three principal reasons. 
First, the FDA is not able to conclusively demonstrate that 
suboptimal but unflawed protocols are substantially “false or mislead-
ing” to warrant regulatory action.  Unlike the case with flaws, the 
presence or absence of a methodological limitation is dependent on 
the cost associated with improving the trial, and is thus always open to 
debate.198  A protocol is suboptimal if and only if the benefits associ-
ated with the absent data outweigh the cost of making the results 
more informative to the prescribing public.  Industry sponsors are al-
ways able to argue that six more months of data, more elderly pa-
tients, or a different comparator would have made the study prohibi-
tively costly. 
 197 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (2000). 
 198 See supra notes 28–35. 
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Second, First Amendment concerns require the FDA to tread 
gingerly when regulating in this area.  The First Amendment permits 
pharmaceutical companies to publish studies that the FDA considers 
false and misleading, as well as distribute them to physicians in re-
sponse to unsolicited queries.199  There is a thin line between actively 
promoting a product with allegedly false and misleading data, and 
merely providing such data to physicians who request it.  The FDA 
must be careful not to disturb the sense of public legitimacy that is 
paramount to the smooth functioning of any administrative agency.  
Thus, when a company walks the line between what is constitutionally 
protected and statutorily condemned, the FDA is likely to err on the 
side of caution, permitting the firm to continue the arguably promo-
tional activity until its behavior is unquestionably prohibited by law.200  
Furthermore, even if industry consistently stayed well within the 
boundaries of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the mere 
existence of the biased data in medical journals and dissemination of 
the information to requesting physicians would likely exert significant 
influence over prescribers. 
Finally, the FDA does not have the resources necessary to police 
firms’ use of post-approval research, nor are the penalties levied by 
the FDA against disseminators of false and misleading data strict 
enough to deter improper industry behavior.201  The FDA simply does 
not have the manpower needed to investigate complaints that com-
petitors are using loaded research methods.  Moreover, even if the 
FDA had the necessary resources, industry would likely still flout the 
law, as the typical penalty is nothing more than a warning letter.  If 
the FDA had access to an army of reviewers and could credibly 
threaten criminal sanctions, trial designers might think twice before 
concocting suboptimal protocols.202  Sadly, however, this is not the 
system in which the FDA operates. 
 199 Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 67, 74–75 (D.D.C. 
1998); Author’s Personal Communication with Peter Hutt, Nov. 2005.    
 200 I do not suggest that the FDA flouts its duty to prosecute violations of the Fed-
eral Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.  My point is merely that, in questionable cases, 
the FDA likely errs on the side of inaction. 
 201 See James S. Benson, State of the Food and Drug Administration, 45 FOOD DRUG 
COSM. L.J. 301, 308 (1990); Teresa Moran Schwartz, Punitive Damages and Regulated 
Products, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1335, 1344 n.51 (1993); Author’s Personal Communica-
tion with Peter Hutt, Nov. 2005. 
 202 Pharmaceutical companies might still publish what they believe to be appro-
priate, but refrain from distributing it. 
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(ii) Patients’ Irrational Demand for Brand Name Drugs 
Before examining the ability of physicians, insurers, journal edi-
tors and the tort system to reign in conflicted trial designers, it is nec-
essary to discuss the tendency of patients to irrationally demand ex-
pensive, brand name medication when there are other, cheaper, safer 
and/or more effective therapies available.  This section should not be 
taken to suggest that brand name drugs rarely offer a benefit over 
cheaper alternatives.  To the contrary, newer medicines often present 
significant advantages over off-patent compounds and non-drug in-
terventions.  This section focuses on the minority of clinical situations 
in which an expensive, brand name medication is not the most  
cost-effective treatment. 
Pharmaceutical companies spend approximately 2.5 billion dol-
lars a year on direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising.203  There is no 
doubt that DTC advertising increases sales.204  The only question is, 
what percentage of the consumers who receive a prescription as a re-
sult of DTC advertising receive better and more cost-effective care 
because of that prescription?  This question is hotly debated,205 but a 
great deal of evidence suggests that much of the demand linked to 
DTC advertising is irrational from a societal standpoint.206  In other 
words, society would be better off if consumers used an alternative 
therapy instead of the advertised drug since the alternative therapy 
would be (a) safer and/or more effective for the patient, or (b) more 
cost-effective, which would mean that additional health care re-
sources would be available for other patients.207  Such an argument, 
however, can be made for just about any product.  Take automobiles 
 203 Meredith B. Rosenthal et al., Promotion of Prescription Drugs to Consumers, 346 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 498, 498 (2002).  
 204 Abramson, supra note 45, at 158–59.  After all, if such advertising did not in-
crease sales by an amount that exceeded the cost of the advertisements, companies 
would cease to engage in DTC marketing. 
 205 Compare Sidney M. Wolfe, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising—Education or Emotion 
Promotion?, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 524 (2002), with Alan F. Holmer, Direct-to-Consumer 
Advertising—Strengthening our Health Care System, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 526 (2002).  
 206 See, e.g., Abramson, supra note 45, at 149–59 (discussing DTC advertising gen-
erally); id. at 258 (citing reports that “Celebrex and Vioxx, two drugs of very limited 
clinical value, have become blockbusters in the United States but not in the rest of 
the world [where DTC advertising is not permitted by the government]”).  See 
ANGELL, THE TRUTH, supra note 21, at 125 (discussing how DTC advertisements are 
prohibited in all developed countries except for the United States and New Zea-
land). 
 207 The phrase “society would be better off” indicates that the sum of everyone’s 
individual levels of utility would be maximized by using alternative treatments.  Such 
an idea takes into account the fact that one individual may gain more utility from 
curing a toenail fungus than another gains from treating her diabetes. 
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for example.  BMW’s marketing campaign may cause an individual to 
purchase the company’s latest creation even though a “generic vehi-
cle” is functionally superior208 or more cost-effective.209
There are three differences between the market for pharmaceu-
ticals and the markets for other products that make the societally ir-
rational demand in the latter more tolerable than in the former.210
First, advertisements for items other than drugs have the poten-
tial to increase the value of the product to the consumer.  One may 
obtain more utility from driving a BMW than a “generic car” not only 
because the BMW is functionally superior to the generic, but also be-
cause the company’s marketing campaign has made the car’s brand 
name synonymous with excellence and prestige.211  In other words, a 
BMW in a world without marketing would be less valuable to a con-
sumer than the exact same vehicle in a society with automobile adver-
tisements.212  It is unclear, however, whether the same is true for 
pharmacologic interventions.  Although one could argue that DTC 
advertising enhances the placebo effect of brand name medication by 
making patients believe more strongly that the drug will work, the is-
sue has never been tested.213  Nor has it been determined whether 
consumers of advertised drugs derive utility from consciously or sub-
consciously believing that they are receiving the best treatment avail-
 208 Functional superiority must be defined according to the consumer’s prefer-
ences.  For example, if an individual values a sound system much more than safety 
features, then a car with a state-of-the-art stereo may be considered functionally supe-
rior to a vehicle with $20,000 worth of safety equipment but an average sound system. 
 209 In this sense, “cost-effective” is defined in terms of the financial cost per unit of 
utility provided by the automobile.  Advertising may cause a consumer to purchase a 
$50,000 BMW and receive 5000 units of utility from its use ($10/unit) even though a 
generic car provides 4000 units of utility and costs $20,000 ($5/unit).  It should be 
noted that the “societally irrational” consumer demand for drugs and cars is not nec-
essarily irrational from the buyer’s perspective.  If an advertised drug is marginally 
more effective than a much cheaper generic, but the patient is wealthy and thus val-
ues the minute increase in effectiveness more than the twenty-five dollar difference 
in co-payments, the brand name medicine represents the personally rational choice.  
Similarly, although most people find that the functional superiority of a BMW over a 
“generic car” is incommensurate with the cost differential, wealthier individuals may 
value the marginal increase in quality more than its price. 
 210 Hereinafter the phrase “irrational demand” signifies a demand that is irra-
tional from the standpoint of society.  When discussing what is rational from one’s 
personal perspective, the word irrational is modified with an adverb such as “person-
ally” or “individually.” 
 211 See BMW Advertisements—Marketing the Ultimate Driving Machine, 
http://www.bmwworld.com/ads/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2007). 
 212 This effect may be strong enough to render the demand for the vehicle no 
longer irrational. 
 213 Author’s Personal Communication with Bernard P. Schachtel, M.D., Aug. 31, 
2005.  
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able.214  In fact, it seems equally plausible (although this has never 
been tested either) that patients who ask for and receive an adver-
tised drug from their doctors experience less of a placebo effect and 
are less confident that they are receiving optimal therapy than those 
who allow physicians to independently prescribe the appropriate 
remedy.215  An individual who initiates a discussion about an adver-
tised drug with her doctor may later question whether she influenced 
the doctor’s decision to prescribe the medication, thereby reducing 
the patient’s confidence in the drug’s effectiveness.216
Second, unbiased, comparative information that is understand-
able to the layman is almost impossible to come by for pharmaceuti-
cals, but easy to obtain for other products.217  Consumer Reports and 
J.D. Power and Associates release easy-to-digest evaluations and com-
parisons of virtually every car.218  Thus, if an automobile advertise-
ment erroneously convinces a consumer that a BMW offers her a 
lower price per unit of utility than a generic car, it is only because the 
buyer failed to sufficiently research her choices.219  In the market for 
pharmaceuticals, however, there is a dearth of unbiased, comparative 
information with which consumers can investigate whether their de-
sire for an advertised medicine is justified.220  As purchasing agents 
for their patients, physicians are supposed to fill the void by discuss-
ing the pros and cons of the advertised drug and alternative thera-
pies.221  The following section, however, demonstrates that physicians 
are often unable to adequately perform this task.222
Third, unlike the individuals who respond to advertisements in 
other industries, consumers who request an advertised medication 
almost always have some form of prescription drug coverage.223  The 
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. 
 217 David Lansky, Providing Information to Consumers, in CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH 
CARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR PROVIDERS, PAYERS, AND POLICYMAKERS 419, 419–27 (Regina 
Herzlinger ed., 2004); J.D. Power III, The Role of Information—J.D. Power’s Paradigm 
Lessons from the Automotive Industry, in CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR PROVIDERS, PAYERS, AND POLICYMAKERS 410, 410–18 (Regina Herzlinger ed., 2004).  
 218 See Consumer Reports, http://www.consumerreports.org/main/home.jsp (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2007); J. D. Power and Assocs.,  http://www.jdpower.com/autos/ (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2007). 
 219 See supra note 209 (discussing “price per unit of utility”). 
 220 See infra Part IV.C.iii.a (discussing proposals to establish an unbiased rating sys-
tem for pharmaceuticals). 
 221 Holmer, supra note 205. 
 222 See infra Part IV.A.iii. 
 223 A recent survey determined that approximately seventy percent of the popula-
tion has health insurance with prescription drug coverage.  This number will likely 
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presence of insurance allows the patient to externalize much of the 
drug’s cost onto the insurance company’s other customers.224  A 
brand name, advertised medication may cost the insurer $400 more 
per month than an alternative, generic compound, but to the con-
sumer, the difference may be an extra $25 co-payment.  A patient 
who believes that the more expensive medication is worth $50 more 
(or any amount greater than $25) will seek out a prescription for the 
brand name drug, pay her copay and externalize the rest of the 
drug’s cost onto her fellow insureds. 
An informed individual shopping for health insurance has an 
incentive to select a plan that does not respond to the whims of con-
sumers’ irrational demand for brand name drugs.  The intelligent 
shopper wishes to forego advertised medications when there are 
cheaper alternatives that are medically equivalent or negligibly infe-
rior to the brand name drug, since, if all of the insurer’s clients do so 
as well, she will secure a health plan with lower premiums.  Unfortu-
nately for such an enlightened consumer, insurance companies do 
not design their prescription drug benefit packages in a way that ade-
quately combats consumers’ irrational demand for brand name 
drugs.225
Although DTC advertising contributes significantly to consum-
ers’ irrational demand, its abolition would not cure the problem.  
Anecdotal reports from friends, or a general belief that newer medi-
cines are generally better than older generics, may cause patients to 
request expensive drugs.  The dearth of unbiased information dis-
cussing the pros and cons of different therapies would prevent con-
sumers from determining which drugs are right for them.  Finally, 
and most importantly, the externalities imposed by the current 
rise as baby boomers age and begin to take advantage of Medicare’s recent commit-
ment to pay for medication.  See Aflac, Aflac Survey Reveals Disparities in Americans’ Per-
ceptions of Vision Health; More than Half of Respondents Report Having Vision Problems, 
June 6, 2005, http://www.aflac.com/us/en/aboutaflac/PressReleaseStory.aspx? 
rid=717509.  Due to the externalities inherent in medical insurance, it is likely that 
more than seventy percent of the patients requesting brand-name, advertised drugs 
from their doctor have prescription drug coverage.  In other words, the group of re-
questing patients likely self-selects for consumers with prescription drug benefits. 
 224 See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-party Insurance Externality: An Eco-
nomic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 139 (1990) (discuss-
ing a similar point in the realm of liability insurance); see also Steven P. Croley & Jon 
D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An Alternative Explanation for Recent Events in Products 
Liability, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 9 (1991).  Although insurance companies’ primary cli-
ents are most often employers, the phrase “other customers” represents the employ-
ees who obtain insurance through their employers and the individuals who purchase 
insurance directly from the insurance company. 
 225 See infra Part IV.A.iv. 
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health insurance climate would still lead consumers to seek out ex-
pensive drugs that are not cost effective. 
(iii) Physicians—Can they Protect us from Methodological 
Bias by Altering their Prescribing Habits? 
Industry advocates might argue that physicians are able to cor-
rect for any methodological bias in commercially-funded trials by al-
tering their prescribing behavior accordingly.226  The argument goes 
as follows: Physicians serve as consumers’ purchasing agents insofar as 
they usher patients toward the safest, most medically effective and 
most cost-effective therapy possible.  Doctors are expected to review 
the medical literature and read published studies with a skeptical eye.  
If a physician reads a study that enrolled a disproportionate number 
of women, erroneously extrapolates the data to men, and prescribes 
the drug in question to both sexes without confirming the soundness 
of her extrapolation, then the doctor has failed her patient and the 
appropriate remedy is a lawsuit for malpractice. 
There are four problems with the idea that physicians can re-
duce the incentive to design suboptimal trials by custom fitting their 
prescribing decisions to their perceptions of methodological limita-
tions. 
First, even if a physician recognizes all pertinent methodological 
limitations, much of the information needed to make sound prescrib-
ing decisions may not exist.  In the case of study populations that are 
 226 See, e.g., Malcolm Gladwell, High Prices—How to Think about Prescription Drugs, 
THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 25, 2004, at 86.  Gladwell discusses AstraZeneca’s develop-
ment of Nexium, attempting to combat the staunch criticism that the drug received 
from Marcia Angell in The Truth about the Drug Companies.  See ANGELL, THE TRUTH, 
supra note 21, at 76–79.  Although Gladwell fails to mention AstraZeneca’s use of in-
appropriate comparators, he admits that the company spent half a billion dollars on 
advertising to “keep cheaper generics at bay.”  Gladwell, supra note 226; see supra note 
39 (discussing of how AstraZeneca used high doses of Nexium and low doses of a ge-
neric product in order to obtain favorable data).  Gladwell goes on to write that  
[o]f course, it is also the case that Nexium is a prescription drug: every 
person who takes Nexium was given the drug with the approval of a doc-
tor—and doctors are professionals who ought to know that there are 
many cheaper ways to treat heartburn.  If the patient was coming in for 
the first time, the doctor could have prescribed what’s known as an H2 
antagonist, such as a generic version of Tagamet (cimetidine), which 
works perfectly well for many people and costs only about twenty-eight 
dollars a month.  If the patient wasn’t responding to Tagamet, the doc-
tor could have put him on the cheaper, generic form of Prilosec,  
omeprazole.  
Gladwell, supra note 226, at 86.  See also Rosenthal et al., supra note 200, at 502 (dis-
cussing how doctors only write prescriptions when they are “familiar with [the drug] 
and comfortable prescribing it.”). 
FALIT_FINAL 10/18/2007  8:47:37 AM 
1020 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:969 
 
unrepresentative of the patient population taking the drug, there will 
be some information available about all of the subpopulations for 
which the drug is approved, since the FDA requires such data for ap-
proval.  Thus, if a study enrolled a disproportionate number of 
women and the drug is approved for use in men as well, a physician 
should be able to obtain the medication’s safety and effectiveness 
profiles for both sexes from the package insert.  With other types of 
methodological limitations, however, the prescriber may be unable to 
obtain the information she needs.  For instance, if an industry-
sponsored, head-to-head post-approval trial concludes that the com-
pany’s brand name medication causes less adverse side effects than a 
generic competitor (an alternative, off-patent drug) in a subpopula-
tion for which there is no FDA approval, a physician will not be able 
to tell if a longer study would have revealed additional side effects.227  
Moreover, if the results were reported in terms of a broad class of side 
effects and data were not collected on the occurrence of individual 
side effects, physicians will not be able to determine if analyzing the 
different adverse effects individually would have yielded different  
results.228
Second, even if the relevant data were available, a comprehen-
sive review of the medical literature pertaining to a popular drug class 
(e.g., statins or Cox-2 inhibitors) would be an impossible undertaking 
for a team of one hundred doctors, let alone a physician with a solo 
practice.229  If the desired data were collected during phase I–III tri-
als, it is likely that the physician would not have to look further than 
the package insert.  Relevant data collected in other non-required 
post-approval studies, however, would be far more difficult to track 
down.  Medical providers do not have the time or expertise to sys-
tematically review clinical trials and evaluate their research meth-
ods.230  Physicians express extreme dissatisfaction with the amount of 
time that they must spend on administrative matters.231  Additional 
responsibilities away from patient care will frustrate them further and 
shrink physicians’ total compensation, thereby reducing the incentive 
 227 See supra Part III.E.ii.a (discussing how pharmaceutical companies may have an 
incentive to sponsor unduly short trials in order to conceal a drug’s side effects). 
 228 See supra Part III.E.iv.c (discussing how pharmaceutical companies may have an 
incentive to inappropriately broaden or shrink categories of adverse side effects). 
 229 Jeremy Grimshaw et al., Cluster Randomized Trials of Professional and Organiza-
tional Behavior Change Interventions in Health Care Settings, 599 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. 
SOC. SCI. 71, 73 (2005) (discussing the potential for “information overload”). 
 230 Id. 
 231 Abigail Zuger, Dissatisfaction with Medical Practice, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 69, 71 
(2004) (discussing administrative burdens associated with managed care).    
FALIT_FINAL 10/18/2007  8:47:37 AM 
2007] POST-APPROVAL TRIALS 1021 
 
for individuals to enter the medical profession.  Primary care, an area 
that already has remarkable difficulty attracting qualified medical stu-
dents,232  is especially vulnerable to reduced physician satisfaction and 
compensation since doctors in this specialty prescribe a diverse array 
of medication. Even if time were not an issue, physicians lack the 
training necessary to analyze complex protocols.233  Many older doc-
tors are not computer literate and have little understanding of the 
Internet.234  Given the discrepancy between doctors’ current ability to 
critique the research methods of clinical trials and what is needed for 
them to make prescribing decisions based on their analyses, training 
physicians to understand the niceties of methodological limitations 
would likely be prohibitively costly. 
Third, even if the data were available and physicians were capa-
ble of consistently spotting methodological limitations, marketing di-
rected at physicians (including sales representatives) might be able to 
erroneously convince physicians that their assessments are flawed 
(and consumers’ irrational demands are, in actuality, societally ra-
tional).235  Although doctors would be able to pool the biased infor-
mation obtained from each firm’s marketing efforts,236 companies 
that spend more hyping up their products would be more likely to in-
fluence prescribers.237  Generics, dietary supplements, and lifestyle 
modifications, all of which are much less marketed than brand name 
pharmaceuticals, would likely be underprescribed.238
Fourth, doctors have a financial interest in pleasing their pa-
tients.  Physicians who have studied the medical literature and de-
termined that the methodological limitations inherent in a com-
pany’s post-approval trials render its drug medically inappropriate for 
a patient must combat the patient’s irrational demand for the prod-
uct.  Suppose a provider determines that an alternative, generic drug 
 232 See generally Ruth-Marie E. Fincher, The Road Less Traveled—Attracting Students to 
Primary Care, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 630 (2004); Michael E. Whitcomb & Jordan J. 
Cohen, The Future of Primary Care Medicine, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 710 (2004).   
 233 Grimshaw et al., supra note 229, at 73. 
 234 Jeffrey L. Drezner, Understanding Adoption of New Technologies by Physicians, 
MEDSCAPE.COM, Feb. 7, 2000, http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/408031. 
 235 See, e.g., Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Is a Gift Ever 
Just a Gift?, 283 JAMA 373, 378 (2000). 
 236 Benjamin Falit, The Path to Cheaper and Safer Drugs: Revamping the Pharmaceutical 
Industry in Light of GlaxoSmithKline’s Settlement, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 174, 174–75 
(2005) [hereinafter Falit, Cheaper & Safer Drugs] (citing T.A.M. Kramer, A Plea for Bi-
ased Information, MEDSCAPE.COM, Feb. 10, 2004, http://www.medscape.com/view 
article/468112_1). 
 237 Lexchin, Interactions, supra note 139, at 64; Wazana, supra note 242, at 378-379. 
 238 Lexchin, Interactions, supra note 139, at 64. 
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would be equally as good as the brand name product in all respects, 
but costs $300 less per month and is therefore the preferred course 
of treatment.  An insured consumer afflicted with an irrational de-
mand might respond that she would rather take the more expensive 
drug since the difference in co-payments is meaningless to her and 
several of her friends have responded well to it.  If, after a thorough 
discussion of the pros and cons of each therapy, the doctor caves in 
to the patient’s irrational request, the patient will be more likely to 
return to the provider’s office for future care.239  A great deal of evi-
dence suggests that physicians frequently accede to patients’ socie-
tally irrational requests for brand name drugs in order to ease the 
strain on the doctor-patient relationship.240
(iv) Insurers—Can Coverage Decisions and Formularies 
Protect us from Methodological Limitations? 
One might contend that insurance companies should be able to 
correct any methodological bias (thereby providing pharmaceutical 
companies with an incentive to design optimal trials) by designing 
drug benefit packages that selectively reimburse the appropriate 
medications.241  There are four problems with such an assertion. 
First, as is the case with physicians’ ability to curb methodologi-
cal bias, the information necessary to make informed decisions about 
the best therapy for each patient may not exist.242  In order to accu-
rately assess the quality of prescription drugs, health plans would 
have to redo the industry-sponsored studies with more informative 
research methods.  For instance, an insurer might collect data on 
more narrow categories of side effects or run the study for a longer 
period of time.243  Insurers are unwilling to engage in such research, 
not only because the cost of such trials might outstrip any savings as-
sociated with the use of more cost-effective medicine, but also be-
cause other health plans could free-ride off of their investments.244
 239 Abramson, supra note 45, at 156. 
 240 See, e.g., id. at 155–57 (speaking to “[d]isempowering the doctor-patient rela-
tionship”). 
 241 See Gladwell, supra note 226, at 89. 
 242 See supra notes 227–28 and accompanying text. 
 243 See supra Parts III.E.ii, iv (discussing how industry sponsors may have an incen-
tive to inappropriately broaden or narrow categories of adverse events or design a 
trial that is shorter than what the public desires). 
 244 Hanson & Logue, supra note 224, at 149.  Even if competitors could not free-
ride (and hence all conducted their own trials), the fact that a trial’s cost outstrips 
the savings that will inure to the insurer does not suggest that society would not 
benefit from conducting the trial.  It may be the case that the benefits will outweigh 
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Since the data generated by the insurer-sponsored clinical trials 
cannot be protected by intellectual property law,245 health plans are 
unable to reap the full return on their investments.246  Free-riding 
competitors who are able to utilize the information without incurring 
any of the costs associated with producing it would be able to offer 
insureds comparatively low premiums. 247  Collectively, insurers have 
an incentive to conduct additional trials in order to determine which 
therapies are the most cost effective, but individually each health 
plan has an incentive to wait until the task is undertaken by a com-
petitor and gain a comparative advantage by free-riding off of its in-
vestment.  The result is a system in which insurers do not sponsor 
clinical trials.248
Second, medicine is as much an art as it is a science.  Insurance 
companies who want to treat their customers as cost-effectively as pos-
sible cannot simply mandate one-size-fits-all, cookbook remedies.249  
the costs only if economies of scale can be exploited, i.e., only if the data can be used 
to shape reimbursement for more insureds. 
 245 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that raw information is not patentable).  The inability to 
protect the data produced by one’s research via intellectual property law is an impor-
tant issue in research sponsored by pharmaceutical companies.  The pharmaceutical 
industry has fought hard to make sure that clinical trial registration requirements do 
not reduce the incentive to invest in research by allowing competitors to free-ride off 
of the sponsoring company’s investment.  See Benjamin Falit, Pharma’s Commitment to 
Maintaining a Clinical Trial Register: Increased Transparency or Contrived Public Appease-
ment?, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 391 (2005) [hereinafter Falit, Pharma’s Commitment]. 
 246 Hanson & Logue, supra note 224, at 149. 
 247 Id. 
 248 If insurers joined together to sponsor clinical trials and reimbursed only the 
most cost effective therapies, pharmaceutical companies would no longer have an 
incentive to design methodologically suboptimal trials, since doing so would not 
make a health plan any more likely to pay for the sponsor’s drug.  Since pharmaceu-
tical companies would no longer design suboptimal protocols, the insurers would 
have very few studies to redo (although they still might choose to conduct their own 
research).  In essence, insurers’ ability to selectively reimburse only the best drugs by 
conducting their own research would likely be sufficient to reduce pharmaceutical 
companies’ incentives to design methodologically suboptimal studies; the insurers 
would not have to actually perform such research.  Nevertheless, the remainder of 
Part IV.A.iv demonstrates that insurers’ capacity to sponsor clinical trials, by itself, 
would likely be insufficient to enable the selective reimbursement of the most cost 
effective drugs for all patients. 
 249 Regina Herzlinger, Uncle Sam is No Doctor—Instead of Tracking Outcomes, System 
Prescribes Medical “Recipes”, USA TODAY, Mar. 28, 2005, at 10A.  The point is not that 
medical practice guidelines and evidence based medicine are deleterious, but rather 
that cost effective care requires some amount of individualization.  This is likely to be 
especially true in the future as developments are made in the field of pharmacoge-
nomics.  Pharmaceutical companies would be hard pressed to argue that personaliza-
tion need not play a role in cost-effective care.  One of the industry’s primary argu-
ments for why the production of me-too (follow-on) drugs are beneficial to society, 
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In some cases, a brand name drug that is generally no more effica-
cious than cheaper alternatives will prove to be the medically appro-
priate and most cost effective therapy.  In other words, it’s extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, for insurers to design benefit packages 
that reimburse only the most cost-effective care in all cases.250  Health 
insurers are forced to reimburse care that will often be inappropriate 
from society’s standpoint, and provide physicians with incentives to 
use the most cost-effective care.251  The collective action and free-
rider problems discussed in relation to insurer-sponsored clinical tri-
als apply to the implementation of innovative reimbursement 
mechanisms as well.  Insurers’ ability to invest in the development of 
a prescription drug benefits program able to selectively reimburse the 
most cost-effective care for all patients, is stifled by competitors’ abil-
ity to costlessly replicate the innovative policy.252
Third, the political backlash against managed care has demon-
strated that physicians and health care consumers desire empower-
ment.253  Patients want to play an integral role in their own care and 
doctors do not want to be second-guessed by corporate bureaucrats.  
Just like physicians, payers have an incentive to please their customers 
so that they continue supplying the company with business.  An in-
surance company that attempts to wage war against consumers’ de-
mands for brand name medications with seemingly despotic formu-
laries may lose business to competitors that cater to the insureds’ 
irrational requests.  Since drugs that are generally not cost-effective 
may be appropriate for some patients, refusals to cover the drugs 
when doctors accede to patients’ requests pit the insurance company 
has been that some individuals may respond poorly to one drug in a class but re-
spond well to a me-too product in the same class.  See DiMasi & Paquette, supra note 
175, at 11–12 (discussing this argument). 
 250 In theory, it is possible to design a system where medical reviewers employed 
by an insurance company review all brand-name prescriptions or prescriptions for 
drugs that tend to generate an irrational demand in consumers.  Although such a 
system might enable an insurer to reimburse only the most cost-effective drugs, ac-
quiring and analyzing the information necessary to make an informed decision in 
every case would likely be prohibitively costly. 
 251 Insurers often use capitation and pay-for-performance mechanisms to provide 
physicians with a financial incentive to render cost effective care.  See Capitation—A 
List of Articles from Managed Care Magazine, http://www.managedcaremag.com 
/capitation.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2007) (list of articles discussing capitation); Am. 
Med. Assoc., Guidelines for Pay-for-Performance Programs, http://www.ama-assn.org 
/ama1/pub/upload/mm/368/guidelines4pay62705.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2007). 
 252 Hanson & Logue, supra note 224, at 149. 
 253 Regina Herzlinger, The Frayed Safety Net, in CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PROVIDERS, PAYERS, & POLICYMAKERS 28, 46 (Regina Herzlinger ed., 
2004) [hereinafter Herzlinger, The Frayed Safety Net]. 
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against the doctor.  Patients are likely to see the insurer’s coverage re-
fusals as self-serving, profit-maximizing devices and, if given a choice 
by their employer, may seek alternative health insurance.254
Collective action and free-rider problems also apply in the con-
text of battling irrational requests for drugs.  Individually, each payer 
lacks the incentive to educate its enrollees on the cost savings (via 
premium reductions) associated with collectively agreeing to utilize 
the most cost-effective therapy, since consumers frequently change 
insurance companies.255  If insurer A invests in combating its custom-
ers’ irrational demand,  insurer B, who later insures these newly-
enlightened individuals, is able to free-ride off of A’s investment by 
costlessly obtaining societally rational consumers.  The money insurer 
B saves by not educating its enrollees allows it to offer lower premi-
ums that attract more customers.  The result is that no payers are will-
ing to combat their customers’ irrational demands with education. 
Fourth, since consumers frequently change employers (and 
thereby change insurers), insurance companies have little incentive 
to design innovative plans which encourage beneficiaries to seek 
high-quality care that is cost-effective over the long term.  Instead, each 
firm has a perverse incentive to minimize short-term costs (the cost of 
care during the period in which a patient is likely to remain insured 
by the company).  If the focus on short-term expenditures increases 
the overall cost to the system because more expensive care is needed 
later in life, then it is of no concern to the company, since the later 
costs are borne by the patient’s new insurer.  In other words, payers 
individually desire an imperfect market for health care services in 
which patients have neither the knowledge nor the incentive to make 
rational purchasing decisions.  Insurers prefer to implement supply-
side techniques that actively manage overuse but fail to correct for 
underuse that does not result in short term cost increases.  For exam-
ple, suppose that there are two, equally effective and equally safe 
medical treatments for a particular ailment.  The infirmity can be 
corrected with a one-time surgery that will cost the insurance com-
pany $5000 or with medication that must be administered for the pa-
tient’s lifetime, which will cost $1000 per year.  From a societal stand-
point, surgery is the best option if the patient is expected to live more 
than five years, since this is the point at which the drug costs exceed 
the cost of the one-time operation.  The insurer, however, has a dif-
ferent perspective.  Even if the patient is expected to live for another 
 254 Id. at 46. 
 255 Id. at 32, 44. 
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sixty years, if the insurer expects that the enrollee will change insur-
ance companies within the next five years, it may rationally choose to 
selectively reimburse the drug (refusing to reimburse the surgery).  
The patient’s next insurer may do the same, and so on down the line. 
(v) Journal Editors—Can they Protect the Public from 
Methodological Limitations by Selectively Publishing 
Soundly Designed Trials? 
The medical profession’s peer review system plays an incredibly 
valuable role in ensuring that only methodologically sound, correctly 
reported research is published and disseminated to physicians.  The 
system, however, is not perfect.  Journal editors, like physicians and 
insurance companies, are limited in their ability to curb methodol-
ogically suboptimal, industry-sponsored phase IV trials.  This is true 
for three principal reasons. 
First, methodologically flawless but suboptimal trials produce 
valid data.256  In order for a doctor to be misled by a study that is 
merely suboptimal, she must erroneously extrapolate the data to a 
situation not spoken to by the targeted protocol.  For instance, if a 
six-month study determines that a brand name drug is safer than an 
alternative generic compound, a doctor who prescribes the medica-
tion for longer than six months on the basis of those results is inap-
propriately assuming that the brand name pharmaceutical will con-
tinue to outperform the generic.  Were it not for physicians’ 
tendency to improperly extrapolate from limited data, suboptimal yet 
flawless trials could not harm the public.257  Therefore, it might be 
argued that journal editors’ decisions not to publish suboptimal but 
flawless trials would be tantamount to disempowering astute pre-
scribers who do not inappropriately extrapolate from such studies in 
order to protect the patients of less perspicacious physicians.  Journal 
editors are unwilling to withstand the attacks from patients, sponsors, 
and physicians that would inevitably accompany such paternalistic 
behavior.  Rather than rejecting a methodologically flawless but 
suboptimal trial, editors prefer to ensure that the results are accu-
rately reported.  As discussed above in Part III.E.vi, full disclosure 
does not eliminate the problem associated with improperly targeted 
research.  Suboptimal protocols deprive consumers and prescribers 
of important knowledge, regardless of whether the studies openly ac-
 256 See supra notes 28–35 and accompanying text (discussing the difference be-
tween methodological limitations and methodological flaws). 
 257 See supra Part III.E.vi (noting that suboptimal protocols would still fail to 
maximally inform medical providers). 
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knowledge that the information is limited.  Furthermore, even with 
accurate reporting, busy physicians who rely on pharmaceutical rep-
resentatives for information and fail to read studies in their entirety 
may be prone to erroneously extrapolating from the limited data. 
Second, from a physician’s perspective, all trials are suboptimal 
to an extent since additional information (e.g., a longer study, data 
on additional subpopulations, etc.) is always helpful.  From society’s 
perspective, however, a protocol is suboptimal if and only if the bene-
fits associated with the absent data outweigh the cost of making the 
results more informative to prescribers.  It would be nearly impossible 
for journal editors to determine which trials are societally suboptimal.  
Industry sponsors will always be able to argue that six more months of 
data would have made the study prohibitively costly, and journal edi-
tors do not have the resources to conduct cost-benefit analyses on 
every publication.  Indeed, it would likely be impossible for any indi-
vidual or group of individuals to differentiate between legitimate tar-
geted research and methodological limitations.  It is for this reason 
that Part IV(C) advocates a system that uses the market, rather than 
technocrats, to police industry trial designers.258
Finally, pharmaceutical companies can still use unpublished 
post-approval trials to influence physicians’ prescribing behavior.  Al-
though studies published in prestigious medical journals are more 
likely to sway doctors,259 pharmaceutical representatives often dis-
seminate the results of unpublished phase IV trials to physicians.260  
Although there is no evidence to suggest that the unpublished data 
has an effect on prescribing behavior, pharmaceutical companies are 
for-profit enterprises that would surely abandon the practice if it did 
not have a positive effect on sales. 
(vi) The Tort System’s Inability to Adequately Deter the 
Creation of Methodologically Suboptimal Protocols 
Product liability laws undoubtedly affect industry behavior.  The 
threat of class action litigation helps to ensure that protocols are 
sound, research is conducted ethically, and results are accurately re-
ported.  The system, however, is not perfect.  Like the FDA, physi-
 258 See supra Part IV.C.iii.b. 
 259 Medical Journals Act to Limit Drug Firms’ Influence, CNN.COM/HEALTH, Sep. 10, 
2003, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/HEALTH/09/09/journals.drugfirms/ (last 
visited October 7, 2007). 
 260 The dissemination of entirely unpublished data is rare, but industry often 
makes use of trade journals that are not peer reviewed.  It is important to note, how-
ever, that industry is not permitted to distribute data on off-label uses.  See Washington 
Legal Found., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 73.     
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cians, insurers and journal editors, the tort system inadequately de-
ters the design of methodologically suboptimal, non-required, non-
label-seeking, post-approval protocols.  A thorough discussion of this 
point would necessitate hundreds of pages and is thus beyond the 
scope of this Article.  It is important, however, to briefly mention the 
four principal reasons for the tort system’s inability to optimally con-
strain industry behavior. 
First, it would be extraordinarily difficult and costly for a plaintiff 
to prove that an unflawed (but suboptimal) trial was negligently de-
signed.  In order to do so, one would have to demonstrate that the 
omitted information possesses a benefit to prescribers that outweighs 
the cost of producing the data.261  In other words, in order to prevail 
at trial, the plaintiff must be able to attribute a dollar value to the 
harm caused by the suboptimal protocol that exceeds what it would 
have cost to rectify the limitation.  Pharmaceutical companies can ar-
gue that alternative trial designs were financially impractical insofar 
as additional expenditures would have caused the firm’s management 
to forego the trial entirely.  Sponsors may contend that a longer trial 
was impossible since patients would have been unlikely to consent to 
extended participation in the study.  In essence, study design does 
not lend itself well to ex post cost-benefit analyses of alternative pro-
tocols since it is inextricably intertwined with the inherently variable 
and unpredictable process of enrolling human subjects who consent 
to the trial’s parameters.  In cases in which the defendant’s behavior 
was entirely legitimate with the exception of allegedly suboptimal 
protocols, plaintiffs will have a hard time overcoming the argument 
that alternative trial designs might have compromised subject en-
rollment, thereby jeopardizing the ability to collect any data  
whatsoever. 
Second, even if it were always possible for plaintiffs to prove neg-
ligence to a jury’s satisfaction, many suboptimal trials would still go 
undiscovered.  In order to conclude that the methodology of a given 
protocol is suboptimal, one must have access to data from other trials 
which fill in the informational gaps left by the methodologically 
suboptimal study.  For instance, imagine a pharmaceutical company 
sponsors a six-month trial that concludes that their brand name drug 
 261 Although a plaintiff could succeed by arguing that the sponsor intentionally or 
recklessly designed the suboptimal trial, a claim of negligence would be the easiest 
hurdle to clear.  Courts will often determine the presence or absence of negligence 
by applying a formula developed by Judge Learned Hand, in which the cost of an un-
taken precaution is weighed against the costs of the injuries the precaution prevents.  
See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).   
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is safer and more effective than an alternative generic compound in a 
subpopulation for which there is no FDA approval.  There is no way 
for one to determine whether the study is inappropriately short with-
out a subsequent trial that compares the two compounds for a longer 
duration.  If the public sector fails to sponsor a longer study, patients 
taking the brand name drug will not be able to discern whether they 
are victims of negligently-designed trials. 
Third, even if all methodologically suboptimal trials could be 
identified and plaintiffs were always able to prove that the studies 
were negligently designed, it would be exceedingly difficult to prove 
causation.  In order to recover damages for their losses, plaintiffs 
must establish the existence of a causal connection between the de-
fendant’s allegedly tortious conduct and the injuries for which recov-
ery is sought.262  For instance, imagine a pharmaceutical company de-
signed a suboptimal trial that misled patients and physicians into 
believing that a brand name drug was more effective than a generic 
alternative, even though the only difference between the two was 
price.  An attorney bringing a class action suit on behalf of the con-
sumers who took the brand name drug to recover the difference in 
cost would have to demonstrate that but for the suboptimally de-
signed trial, the alleged victims would have foregone the brand name 
medication in favor of less expensive therapy.  Pharmaceutical com-
panies would be able to argue that, had the trial yielded less favorable 
results, the company would not have used sales representatives to dis-
seminate the data.  Without detail personnel alerting doctors to the 
results, physicians would have been less likely to use the data when 
writing prescriptions.  Furthermore, sponsors would contend that, 
even if physicians were fully aware that cost was the only differentiat-
ing factor between the drugs, it is unlikely that they could have over-
come patients’ demand for brand name drugs.  In essence, the bur-
den is on the plaintiff class to prove that the absence of a 
methodologically suboptimal trial would have caused (a) the physi-
cian to suggest an alternative remedy and (b) the patient to accept 
the prescriber’s recommendation.  Given the speculative nature of 
such inquiries, establishing causation is likely to be a formidable ob-
stacle for any plaintiff class. 
 262 Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, 
Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 73–91 (1975); Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 
9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 66–68 (1956); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Ex-
posure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851, 855 (1984) 
[hereinafter Rosenberg, Causal Connection] (citing H.L.A. HART & A. HONORE, 
CAUSATION IN THE LAW 64–76 (1959). 
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Finally, the tort system is designed in such a way that defendant 
companies litigating large scale tort claims have an advantage over 
disaggregated plaintiffs.  Since the defendant remains constant in all 
cases, it can take advantage of economies of scale to an extent that 
the various classes of plaintiffs cannot.263  In any suit, each party in-
vests in the litigation up until the point where the expected return of 
the investment no longer exceeds its cost.264  The stakes are higher 
for the defendant than any incomplete plaintiff class265 since the de-
fendant, unlike the plaintiffs, must litigate the same issues in trials 
brought by other alleged victims.266  Thus, the defendant will ration-
ally invest more than its adversaries, making full compensation for 
the plaintiffs’ injuries unlikely. 267
B. Solutions Offered by Other Authors 
Recognizing that the current legal/regulatory regime is incapa-
ble of exerting sufficient pressure on industry sponsors to eliminate 
methodological limitations, several authors have proposed reforms to 
the process of designing clinical protocols. 
Bero and Rennie argue that pharmaceutical companies have a 
moral duty to design trials that best serve the public health and thus 
should unilaterally eliminate methodological bias.268  Sponsors of 
clinical trials, however, arguably have a legal duty to maximize share-
holder wealth, even if such wealth maximization comes at the price of 
harming the public health.269  At the very least, pharmaceutical com-
panies are forced to serve two diametrically opposed masters and 
therefore must choose between rewarding investors who have put 
their faith in the firm and attending to the needs of non-shareholder 
 263 Rosenberg, Causal Connection, supra note 262, at 902; David Rosenberg, Re-
sponse: Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. 
L. REV. 831, 852–53 (2002) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation]. 
 264 Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation, supra note 263, at 848–49.  It is generally be-
lieved that plaintiffs’ attorneys calculate the proper investment based on their ex-
pected payout.  Assuming a one-third contingency fee structure, the attorney for a 
plaintiff class will continue investing time and money into a trial as long as the ex-
pected judgment increases by more than three times the amount required to pro-
duce it.  See id. at 889–890 (discussing in detail the manner in which plaintiffs’ attor-
neys determine optimal levels of investment in class action litigation). 
 265 The term “incomplete plaintiff class” signifies that some victims are not in-
cluded in the class. 
 266 See Rosenberg, Causal Connection, supra note 262, at 848–49; Rosenberg, Manda-
tory-Litigation, supra note 263, at 902. 
 267 See Rosenberg, Causal Connection, supra note 262, at 852–53; Rosenberg, Manda-
tory-Litigation, supra note 263, at 903. 
 268 Bero & Rennie, supra note 14, at 229. 
 269 See supra Part II.B. 
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constituencies.270  Bero and Rennie argue that this dilemma is easily 
resolved in favor of the public health but, as discussed in Part II.B, 
courts and legal scholars do not agree.271
Angell has called for the creation of an independent public body 
with the authority to design and administer clinical trials.  She writes: 
Drug companies would be required to contribute a percentage of 
revenues to this institute, but their contributions would not be re-
lated to particular drugs . . . . The institute would then contract 
with independent researchers in academic medical centers to 
conduct drug trials.  The researchers would design the trials, ana-
lyze the data, write the papers, and decide about publication.272
Angell does not specify whether the pharmaceutical companies 
would still be permitted to fund and conduct clinical trials outside of 
the agency’s control or, if so, whether the FDA would consider such 
studies for approval decisions.273  From a constitutional perspective, 
however, the answers to these questions are of paramount impor-
tance.  If pharmaceutical companies were prevented from conducting 
independent research or were financially penalized for doing so, the 
general First Amendment right to pursue knowledge would likely 
destine the regime for failure.274  Congress or the FDA could constitu-
 270 Id. 
 271 See Elhauge, supra note 8, at 733 n.1.  Bero and Rennie recognize that moral 
compulsion is insufficient to prompt the design of trials in which competitor prod-
ucts are used as comparators.  Bero & Rennie, supra note 14, at 229.  They propose 
two, alternative regulatory remedies to deal with the issue.  First, they argue for the 
collection of a “user fee” from pharmaceutical companies that is used to fund studies 
of comparative effectiveness.  Id.  Due to the similarity between this proposal and 
those advocated by Angell and Abramson, a discussion of it is deferred until later in 
this section, where the solutions proffered by those authors are introduced.  Id.  Sec-
ond, Bero and Rennie suggest that “data comparing new drugs with available alterna-
tives for effectiveness and cost be added as an additional requirement for drug ap-
proval.”  Id.  Such a regime is likely to be counterproductive since placebo-controlled 
studies are significantly less expensive than those using pharmacologic interventions 
as comparators, and in some cases, the marginal advancement in medical knowledge 
created by the head-to-head trial may not justify the decline in research that follows 
from the increased cost of conducting clinical trials.  See supra Part III.E.v.a. 
 272 ANGELL,  THE TRUTH, supra note 21, at 245. 
 273 It is also unclear whether, under Angell’s proposal, industry-funded and indus-
try-designed phase IV trials could serve as the post-marketing evidence of safety 
and/or efficacy often required by the FDA for the drug to stay on the market. 
 274 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482–83 (1965).  The Court discussed 
the unifying principle undergirding prior case law: 
By Pierce v. Society of Sisters the right to educate one's children as one 
chooses is made applicable to the States by the force of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  By Meyer v. Nebraska the same dignity is 
given the right to study the German language in a private school.  In 
other words, the State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First 
FALIT_FINAL 10/18/2007  8:47:37 AM 
1032 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:969 
 
tionally stipulate that only those trials conducted through the new 
federal body will be considered for approval decisions,275 but such a 
system would fail to curb methodological bias in non-mandatory, 
non-label-seeking phase IV trials.276
Abramson’s proposal is similar to Angell’s but avoids the thorny 
constitutional issues.  He too advocates for the creation of an inde-
pendent public body, stating that the newly-created agency would 
“have the power to require that studies include people of similar age, 
gender and medical condition to those to whom the results would be 
applied . . . [and] that studies be continued long enough to deter-
mine the benefits and side effects of the various treatments.”277  
Unlike Angell, however, Abramson stipulates that the pharmaceutical 
companies would still be permitted to conduct research on their own, 
without oversight from the federal body.  Under his proposal, the 
agency’s only power to enforce its requirements of methodological 
purity would lie in its ability to certify research as valid or invalid.278  
Thus, in order for the oversight committee to be effective, physicians 
would have to be convinced that all “unapproved research” is not 
worthy of their attention.  If physicians still take such research into 
account when writing prescriptions, the incentive to design method-
ologically suboptimal trials will remain even though such studies are 
not eligible for governmental certification. 
Although Abramson’s proposal might reduce the number of 
methodological limitations as well as their egregiousness, it is likely 
that other solutions would yield a more favorable cost-benefit trade-
Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge.  The right 
of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or 
to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to 
read and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to 
teach—indeed the freedom of the entire university community.  With-
out those peripheral rights the specific rights would be less secure. And 
so we reaffirm the principle of the Pierce and the Meyer cases. 
Id.  at 482 (citations omitted). 
 275 Author’s Personal Communication with Laurence Tribe, Mar. 15, 2005.  
 276 See supra note 61.  Given the FDA’s general failure to ensure the conduction of 
mandatory post-approval studies it is questionable whether such a regime would re-
duce the extent of methodological bias in FDA-required phase IV trials. 
 277 ABRAMSON, supra note 45, at 251.  It is unclear why Abramson advocates for a 
new governmental body, rather than expanding the FDA.  As the FDA commands 
significant respect from the public and the decisions of any new body would have to 
be reconciled with the FDA anyway, it seems foolish to create an entirely new gov-
ernmental entity. 
 278 Id. at 252. 
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off.279  Pharmaceutical companies will expend vast amounts of re-
sources defending their territory.280  They will argue that the enroll-
ment of patients who consent to a trial’s parameters is an inherently 
variable and unpredictable process that should not be second-
guessed by centralized planners distanced from the sponsor’s busi-
ness concerns.  If enrolling subjects and securing their consent to 
remain in the trial is sufficiently expensive, it may be in the public’s 
interest to conduct a shorter study or use a patient population that is 
only somewhat representative of the individuals receiving the drug in 
the real world.  Industry sponsors will contend that, if they are forced 
to obey the oversight committee, valuable research will go undone 
since the more costly studies demanded by the agency will be unjusti-
fiable from a business perspective.  Given inertial forces and the in-
evitable industry backlash, the agency may have difficulty establishing 
a brand name that commands enough respect to alter physician be-
havior.281
Unlike the case with methodological flaws, the presence or ab-
sence of a methodological limitation is always open to debate.282  A 
flaw produces invalid data that can be translated into improper 
treatment without any further error on the part of the physician.  A 
limitation, however, is only dangerous if the prescriber extrapolates 
inappropriately from the information.283  Centralized government 
oversight of methodological flaws is less problematic than the man-
agement of limitations since the existence of the former, but not the 
latter, can be concretely proven by the oversight committee.  Since 
cost considerations always arise when one evaluates a methodological 
 279 Abramson’s proposal can be criticized for essentially maintaining the status 
quo.  The FDA currently has the power to enforce its requirements of methodologi-
cal purity by certifying non-required post-approval protocols as valid or invalid.  
However, limited resources restrict the FDA’s ability to police all post-marketing re-
search.  See supra Part IV.A.i.  Abramson’s proposal therefore seems like nothing 
more than a recommendation to increase funding to the FDA so that it can review 
non-required phase IV results. 
 280 These costs must be taken into account when one calculates the price tag at-
tached to the creation of a federal oversight committee. 
 281 Moreover, as Abramson notes, the federal body would be a primary target for 
industry capture.  ABRAMSON, supra note 45, at 250.   Insulating the committee from 
private interests would be a difficult and costly process that must be considered when 
calculating the cost-benefit trade-off associated with the establishment of the agency. 
 282 See supra notes 28–35 and accompanying text. 
 283 An example of improper extrapolation might be failing to recognize that the 
study enrolled predominantly women and applying the results to alter the treatment 
of a male patient. 
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limitation,284 the optimal mechanism for preventing methodological 
limitations is to provide industry sponsors with a profit incentive to 
design unbiased trials. 
C. Designing a New Solution 
(i) Supply-side vs. Demand-side Solutions—A Macro Level 
Perspective 
On the macro level, the problem of methodological limitations 
can be approached in two ways.  First, one can devise a supply-side in-
tervention that acts directly on the industry sponsors, subjecting the 
design of clinical trials to continuous public scrutiny or mandating 
that protocols are created according to certain well-defined parame-
ters.  Angell’s suggestion that “[d]rug companies should no longer be 
permitted to control the clinical testing of their own drugs” is an ex-
ample of such a solution.285  Alternatively, one can devise a demand-
side intervention that uses market forces to sculpt industry behavior.  
Abramson’s proposal can be understood as a demand-side solution 
since its success depends on reduced physician demand (i.e., de-
creased willingness to write prescriptions) for drugs whose ostensible 
benefit is demonstrated predominantly by governmentally-uncertified 
clinical trials.286
Demand-side interventions that seek to curb methodological 
bias via physician prescribing habits are likely to be superior to sup-
ply-side solutions for three reasons.  First, as discussed above with re-
gard to Angell’s proposal, regimes that act directly on pharmaceutical 
companies are likely to be unconstitutional.287  Second, the central-
ized planning/oversight inherent in supply-side solutions is inapt at 
ferreting out only those methodological limitations which are not jus-
tified by sponsors’ cost considerations.288  Finally, demand-side inter-
ventions raise fewer concerns of corruption and agency capture, and 
are thus more likely to be viewed as legitimate by the public.  For ex-
 284 For example, one must determine whether the cost of enrolling more repre-
sentative patients is justified by the marginal increase in information provided by the 
study. 
 285 ANGELL, THE TRUTH, supra note 21, at 244. 
 286 “Governmentally uncertified” studies are those that, even if approved by the 
FDA, did not receive approval from the new, federal body in charge of overseeing 
the design of clinical trials. 
 287 See supra notes 272–76 and accompanying text. 
 288 See supra notes 28–35 and accompanying text (providing a more thorough dis-
cussion of why the presence of methodological limitations—but not flaws—depends 
on sponsors’ cost structure). 
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ample, the governmental committee proposed by Abramson is less 
vulnerable to industry influence than that proffered by Angell, since 
the success of the former, but not the latter, depends on doctors’ 
widespread belief that the federal body overseeing the design of 
clinical trials is able to consistently (and without bias) distinguish be-
tween methodologically sound and unsound trials.  Under Abram-
son’s demand-side regime, if doctors suspect that the oversight com-
mittee has been corrupted by corporate influence, they will strip it of 
its power by ceasing to value its certification decisions.289
(ii) Supply-side versus Demand-side Solutions—A Micro 
Level Perspective 
Within the realm of solutions that purport to curb methodologi-
cal bias by altering prescribers’ behavior, one must make a micro 
level choice of whether to use a supply-side or a demand-side inter-
vention.  Supply-side proposals are those that act directly on doctors 
without altering patients’ demand for more appropriate prescrib-
ing.290  For instance, Soumerai and Avorn have suggested that the 
government comparatively evaluate various therapies, hire detail per-
sonnel, and employ the same techniques used by pharmaceutical 
sales representatives to decrease societally irrational prescribing.291  
Demand-side interventions are those that utilize the market for phy-
sician services to effectuate change.  For example, in 1989, the New 
York State Department of Health developed a Cardiac Surgery Re-
porting System (CSRS) that collected and tracked clinical data on all 
cardiac surgeries performed in New York hospitals.292  The Depart-
ment of Health hoped that, by issuing annual report cards containing 
risk-adjusted mortality and complication rates for both hospitals and 
 289 Physicians’ power to effectively override the oversight committee’s certification 
decisions is a double-edged sword insofar as industry sponsors may be able to erro-
neously convince prescribers that the agency’s determinations are flawed.  See supra 
Part IV.B. 
 290 See Richard M. J. Bohmer, Changing Physician Behavior (Harv. Bus. Sch. Case 
No. 9-699-124, Mar. 22, 2000) (offering an excellent discussion of the mechanisms 
through which physician behavior can be influenced). 
 291 See Stephen B. Soumerai & Jerry Avorn, Principles of Educational Outreach (Aca-
demic Detailing) to Improve Clinical Decision Making, 263 JAMA 549 (1990).  Although 
studies have found such “academic detailing” to be successful at changing prescrib-
ers’ behavior, it is enormously resource intensive.  See Bohmer, supra note 290, at 21; 
Stephen B. Soumerai & Jerry Avorn, Economic and Policy Analysis of University-based 
Drug “Detailing,” 24 MED. CARE 313, 322 (1986). 
 292 Richard M. J. Bohmer et al., Bridges to Excellence: Bringing Quality Health Care to 
Life (Harv. Bus. Sch. Case No. 9-604-030, Jan. 20, 2005); Regina E. Herzlinger & Seth 
Bokser, Note on Accountability in the U.S. Health Care System (Harv. Bus. Sch. Case No. 9-
302-007, Aug. 19, 2004).  
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individual physicians, consumers’ desire to be treated by a top per-
former would put pressure on surgeons to improve the quality of 
care.293
As was the case at the macro level, demand-side initiatives at the 
micro level are likely to be more effective than supply-side solutions. 
This is true for two reasons.  First, only demand-side interventions are 
capable of aligning the interests of all three contributors to the ulti-
mate health care decision—the provider, the payer, and the patient.  
As seen above in the discussion of consumers’ irrational demand for 
brand name drugs, patients have tremendous power to influence 
medical decisions.294  Second, the public is likely to have less respect 
for programs that employ technocrats to second-guess physicians’ 
prescribing decisions than for those that make use of market forces to 
alter prescriber behavior.  Utilization management,295 the quintessen-
tial supply-side technique for altering prescribing decisions, has been 
met with significant resistance as physicians and patients view such 
oversight as adversarial and injurious to the doctor-patient relation-
ship.296
(iii) Consumer-Driven Drug Benefits297
I have previously suggested, albeit in another context, that the 
FDA should comparatively rate drugs along three dimensions—
clinical effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and safety.298  Ray et al. have 
 293 See supra note 292.  In actuality, New York’s CSRS possesses elements of a sup-
ply-side intervention as well since physicians and hospitals likely responded to the 
data not only because receiving a good report card is good for business, but because 
they drew personal pride from being recognized as a top performer. 
 294 See supra Part IV.A.ii. 
 295 See Bohmer, supra note 290, at 15-16 (offering an excellent explanation of what 
utilization management entails); see generally INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CONTROLLING 
COSTS AND CHANGING PATIENT CARE?: THE ROLE OF UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT (Brad-
ford H. Gray & Marilyn J. Field eds., 1989). 
 296 Herzlinger, The Frayed Safety Net, supra note 253, at 46. 
 297 This title, “Consumer-Driven Drug Benefits,” is based on the name “Consumer-
Driven Health Care,” which was coined by Regina Herzlinger.  See id.  The consumer-
driven model advocated here is based on several of Professor Herzlinger’s writings.  
The reader who desires additional information about the benefits of a system that 
empowers patients and/or further proof that such reform will curb inappropriate 
prescribing (thereby reducing the incentive to design methodologically suboptimal 
trials) should look to the following works: REGINA E. HERZLINGER, MARKET-DRIVEN 
HEALTH CARE (1997); CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR PROVIDERS, 
PAYERS, AND POLICYMAKERS (Regina E. Herzlinger ed., 2004); Regina E. Herzlinger, 
Let’s Put Consumers in Charge of Health Care, HARV. BUS. REV., July 2002, at 44 [herein-
after Herzlinger, Consumers in Charge]. 
 298 Falit, Cheaper & Safer Drugs, supra note 236, at 176–177.  This article argues that 
a periodically updated rating system would reduce the extent to which pharmaceuti-
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also argued that society would be best served by a federal body that 
“assesses pharmaceutical effectiveness.”299  Such an evaluation system, 
if used to eliminate methodological limitations in clinical trials, is 
best conceptualized as a demand-side program on the macro level 
but a supply-side regime on the micro level.  The governmentally-
sponsored rating system does not act directly on pharmaceutical 
companies, but rather purports to influence their behavior by alter-
ing physicians’ demand (their willingness to write prescriptions) for 
drugs.  It thus acts to influence demand at the macro level.  On the 
micro level, however, the system does not rely on market forces; it in-
stead acts directly on physicians by supplying them with previously 
unavailable information.300
The establishment of a federal rating system, by itself, would do 
little to curb consumers’ irrational demand for heavily-advertised 
brand-name drugs for which there are other, more appropriate 
remedies.  Physicians and health plans would still possess a financial 
interest in pleasing their customers by succumbing to their inappro-
priate requests.  As discussed in the previous section, the ideal inter-
vention would influence demand at both the macro and micro levels. 
The American system of health care delivery has changed over 
the last decade insofar as consumers are playing a more active role 
than ever.301  Increasing numbers of Americans see themselves as 
their own primary care providers who feel obligated to share in the 
medical decision-making process.302  The time therefore seems right 
to grant patients the autonomy and decision-making power they de-
sire.  A comprehensive rating system, coupled with financial incen-
tives to medicate appropriately (provided at the level of the patient), 
would be a demand-side intervention at both the macro and micro 
cal companies distort the truth in their marketing efforts (including sales representa-
tives’ visits to physicians), reduce drug prices without significantly impacting research 
and development by catalyzing an industry-wide scale back in marketing, and de-
crease the conflict of interest inherent in the FDA’s post-approval surveillance. 
 299 Ray et al., supra note 126, at 2031.  
 300 One could argue that Ray et al.’s proposal acts on the demand side at the mi-
cro level since health plans will use the information to craft better reimbursement 
policies and pressure doctors to prescribe drugs in a more cost conscious fashion by 
selectively contracting with providers who combat patients’ irrational demands.  Such 
an argument, however, ignores the fact that under the current regime, payers—like 
providers—have a financial incentive to please their customers by acquiescing to in-
appropriate requests for brand name medication.  The demand-side effect is there-
fore likely to be small in comparison to a system that financially rewards consumers 
for using pharmaceuticals in a socially rational manner. 
 301 See, e.g., Herzlinger, Consumers in Charge, supra note 297; Bohmer, supra note 
290, at 21. 
 302 See HERZLINGER, MARKET-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 297, at 47–84. 
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levels that could go a long way to decreasing the extent of methodo-
logical bias. 
(a) Establishing a Comparative Evaluation System at the 
National Level303
As Ray et al. have suggested, Congress could create a federal 
body whose sole mission is to conduct comparative evaluations of 
drugs and alternative sources of therapy.304  The assessments would be 
disseminated to the public in a format that laymen can understand.305  
The agency  
would convene expert panels that would critically evaluate exist-
ing data and, when indicated, request additional data from manu-
facturers.  This process would provide [patients with valuable in-
formation],306 physicians with guidelines for therapeutic 
decisions, and payers with the basis for managing pharmaceutical 
benefits, but it would not restrict the autonomy of either.307   
As Ray et al. write, the new organization would have the power to 
conduct additional research if it feels that the cost of such studies is 
outweighed by the increased accuracy of the comparative evaluations.  
The system “could be funded by subscription fees from payers, con-
tributions by payers to research on specific questions, or a very small 
tax on . . . pharmaceutical agents.”308
 303 Establishing a federal rating system for pharmaceuticals is not indispensable to 
this Article’s proposal.  The mandatory disclosure of cost and quality data (including 
the costs of all prescriptions) by payers and providers would likely be sufficient.  See 
infra notes 329–30 and accompanying text.  Such information could be compiled and 
translated into easily understandable, comparative data for laymen.  Consumers could 
rely on these data when selecting an insurance company or provider. 
 304 Ray et al., supra note 126, at 2031.  Alternatively, as I have previously written, 
the FDA could expand to take on the task of rating drugs.  Falit, Cheaper & Safer 
Drugs, supra note 236, at 176–77.  The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) may be best suited to compare cost effectiveness, but if the public sector solu-
tion advocated below is adopted, CMS would cease to exist.  The comparative drug 
evaluations are likely to become more accurate as time passes.  When a drug is first 
marketed, it may be difficult to determine precisely how the compound stacks up 
against alternative therapies. 
 305 A more esoteric yet concise version could be distributed to physicians and 
health plans. 
 306 Ray et al. do not mention patients as potential beneficiaries of the information, 
which suggests that they envisioned the creation of the governmental body as a sup-
ply-side intervention at the micro level. 
 307 Ray et al, supra note 126, at 2031. 
 308 Id.  Under current law, no pharmaceutical company may advertise that their 
compound is superior (in terms of safety or effectiveness) to another drug unless the 
claim has been demonstrated by “substantial evidence or substantial clinical experi-
ence.”  See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2007).   There is no reason, however, for the federal rat-
ing body to be held to the same standard.  Unlike companies advertising their own 
FALIT_FINAL 10/18/2007  8:47:37 AM 
2007] POST-APPROVAL TRIALS 1039 
 
Although Herzlinger suggests that health care quality and cost 
savings could be maximized by having employers provide the neces-
sary comparative data, there are three reasons for doing it at the na-
tional level.309  First, employers may lack an incentive to efficiently col-
lect and disseminate the information.  If an employer is successful in 
reducing its workers’ health care costs, improving the quality of care 
and catalyzing innovation amongst participating health plans, then it 
will likely attract a disproportionate number of sick employees.  This 
will drive up labor costs, leaving the firm at a comparative disadvan-
tage.310  Second, the collective action and free-rider problems dis-
cussed above would prevent employers from reaping a full return on 
their investments, prompting them to invest too little in data collec-
tion.311  Health insurers are often able to keep the guidelines that 
sculpt reimbursement decisions hidden from the public eye since 
they do not release the details to their beneficiaries.312  Here, the 
purpose is to inform consumers directly so that they can make their 
own health care decisions, and thus, the information must be re-
leased to the patients.  Without a mechanism for patenting the data, 
it would be impossible to prevent other companies from free-riding 
off of an employer’s efforts.  Third, employers would not be able to 
conduct their own studies when there are insufficient data to con-
struct meaningful comparisons of available therapies.  This is true not 
only because many employers lack the resources, but also because of 
collective action and free-rider problems.  Free-riding competitors 
who are able to utilize the information without incurring any of the 
products, the scientists creating the ratings will be impartially comparing drugs on 
the basis of all available evidence. 
 309 See, e.g., Herzlinger, Consumers in Charge, supra note 297.  One must keep in 
mind that Professor Herzlinger’s writings are much broader in scope than this Arti-
cle insofar as they address the provision of all types of health care, rather than speak-
ing only to pharmacological interventions.  Additionally, public sector reforms seem 
to be beyond the scope of Professor Herzlinger’s article.  She assumes arguendo that 
the legal/regulatory regime which shapes the purchase the health insurance will re-
main fully intact.  Indeed, Herzlinger has elsewhere argued that the government 
should establish a “health care SEC” that ensures transparency in comparative in-
formation relating to the quality of health care providers.  See, e.g., Regina E. 
Herzlinger, A Health Care SEC: The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth 
[hereinafter Herzlinger, Health Care SEC], in CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PROVIDERS, PAYERS AND POLICYMAKERS 797, 797–810 (Regina 
Herzlinger ed., 2004); Regina E. Herzlinger & Benjamin Falit, Long-Term Health 
Insurance Policies in a Value-Driven Health Care System: Implications for Physicians 
(2007) (submitted for publication, on file with author). 
 310 See Jacob Glazer & Thomas G. McGuire, Private Employers Don’t Need Formal Risk 
Adjustment, 38 INQUIRY 260, 267 (2001). 
 311 See supra Part IV.A.iv. 
 312 Bohmer, supra note 290, at 19. 
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costs associated with producing it would be able to offer insureds 
comparatively low premiums. 
Notwithstanding the drawbacks associated with relying on em-
ployers to inform medical consumers, Herzlinger’s desire to keep 
government out of the business of providing comparative data is 
sound policy.313  Such a goal, however, may be infeasible for compara-
tive drug information.  The potential need to conduct additional 
studies separates comparative drug data from information pertaining 
to the quality of health care payers and providers, as does the pro-
prietary nature of unpublished drug data.  Under any consumer-
driven system (like the system I advocate here), information reigns 
supreme.  If the solution advocated below is adopted, it is likely that 
private companies will emerge to compile and disseminate compara-
tive data.  Ideally, the government (i.e., the federal body discussed in 
this section) would stay out of the business of providing such data.  
The federal body’s sole responsibilities would be to mandate the dis-
closure of information by manufacturers, and conduct additional tri-
als that serve the public health, but for which a lack of a profit incen-
tive makes it unlikely that industry will run them. 
This ideal scenario, however, is unlikely to work in practice.  In 
order for private-sector firms to adequately rate drugs, they must be 
privy to data from all published and unpublished trials, regardless of 
whether such studies were prematurely terminated or not.  Unless le-
gally required to do so, pharmaceutical companies are not likely to 
disclose the results of unpublished trials (whether the trials were 
completed or not) to private companies, since doing so would be 
akin to releasing the information into the public domain.  Industry 
rightly views its unpublished data as proprietary information that, if 
leaked, would provide competitors with a competitive advantage.314  
Mandating that pharmaceutical companies disclose all data to private 
sector firms making comparative drug evaluations would likely be a 
mistake since it could significantly reduce ex ante incentives to en-
gage in research and development.  If pharmaceutical companies are 
able to costlessly obtain the research secrets of their competitors, 
 313 Indeed, Regina Herzlinger and I argue in a forthcoming paper that the collec-
tion and dissemination of data pertaining to payers and providers should be per-
formed entirely by the private sector.  See Herzlinger & Falit, supra note 309 (discuss-
ing how governmental mandates to disclose cost and quality information for payers 
and providers may serve as an adequate substitute to comparative drug data). 
 314 Falit, Pharma’s Commitment, supra note 245, at 396 n.40 (quoting Catherine D. 
DeAngelis et al., Clinical Trial Registration:  A Statement from the International Committee 
of Medical Journal Editors, 292 JAMA 1363, 1364 (2004); Drummond Rennie, Trial Reg-
istration: A Great Idea Switches from Ignored to Irresistible, 292 JAMA 1359, 1360 (2004)). 
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there will be an incentive to free-ride off of such information rather 
than expending the resources necessary to develop compounds from 
other sources.  If a governmental organization were performing the 
comparative drug evaluations, however, secrecy could be more easily 
maintained, and industry would likely be more willing to release pro-
prietary information to the federal body. 
(b) Giving Patients a Financial Incentive to Seek Out Payers 
Who Selectively Reimburse Cost-effective Medicines 
and Providers Who Prescribe Pharmaceuticals in a 
Socially Rational Fashion315
Consumer-driven health care seeks to improve the market for 
health insurance and health care services by creating cost-conscious, 
value-driven consumers who shop for health plans and medical 
treatment the same way that they shop for any consumer good—by 
examining the evidence, comparing costs, and making a decision 
based on personal (and often idiosyncratic) preferences.  Such a sys-
tem provides patients with a financial incentive to seek out health 
plans that selectively reimburse cost-effective medicines and physi-
cians who prescribe drugs that offer the maximum ratio of utility to 
cost.316 Consumer-driven health care boils down to the implementa-
tion of two basic principles: (1) individual purchasing and (2) wide-
scale pooling of the insurance risk.317  This section  addresses each 
principle in turn. 
 315 The ideal system would involve a great deal of change.  This Article lays out the 
conceptual groundwork, omitting many of the nuances that would be vital to its im-
plementation as well as a thorough discussion of the supporting literature.  This is 
done to keep the scope of the Article manageable and allow for maximum readabil-
ity.  See Herzlinger & Falit, supra note 309 (offering a more detailed discussion of 
some of these concepts).  Some parts of this section are adapted from Benjamin 
Falit, The Bush Administration’s Health Care Solution: The Proper Establishment of a Con-
sumer-Driven Health Care Regime, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 632, 632–39 (2006). 
 316 Two physiologically identical patients may need to be treated differently be-
cause one values health and/or comfort more than the other.  For those patients 
who value comfort more than most, this may mean treating toenail fungus with an 
expensive product even though a generic competitor would have been negligibly in-
ferior.  In other words, society should not be concerned with convincing patients that 
the value they place on certain types of care is irrational.  Society should, however, 
attempt to rid consumers of erroneous beliefs surrounding a particular drug’s ability 
to deliver the desired type of care more effectively than alternative therapy. 
 317 The creation and dissemination of unbiased, comparative information might 
be considered a third principle. 
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(1) Individual Purchasing 
Inflationary pressures caused by shortages in goods and labor 
during World War II led President Roosevelt to create the National 
War Labor Board (NWLB).318  The NWLB immediately passed the 
“Little Steel formula,” which limited employers’ ability to increase 
wages.  Companies were therefore forced to compete for workers by 
expanding fringe benefits such as health insurance.319  In an effort to 
“maintain the illusion that wage controls were working,” the IRS de-
clared that health benefits are not wages and are therefore not tax-
able.320  The tax code followed the approach taken by the IRS during 
World War II; since the 1950s, it has permitted employers’ to deduct 
the cost of employees’ health benefits and excluded such benefits 
from employees’ gross income.321  This double-dipping creates a sys-
tem in which taxpayers fund a substantial portion of America’s health 
care costs.322  The foregone governmental revenue has the same eco-
nomic effect as a direct subsidy to workers who receive health bene-
fits from their employers.323  The benefits of the subsidization, how-
ever, are not realized by all Americans; those who purchase health 
insurance in the private market (outside of employer-sponsored cov-
erage) must pay with after-tax dollars.324
In order to unleash market forces (via the consumer) on the 
health care industry, one must remove the incentive to purchase 
health care through an intermediary (i.e., the employer).  There are 
three basic ways in which Congress can remove the tax incentive to 
purchase health insurance and health care services through an em-
 318 RICHARD E. SCHUMANN, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR: BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
COMPENSATION FROM WORLD WAR II THROUGH THE GREAT SOCIETY (2003), 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/cm20030124ar04p1.htm. 
 319 David B. Kendall, A Health Insurance Tax Credit: The Key to More Coverage and 
Choice for Consumers, in CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR PROVIDERS, 
PAYERS AND POLICYMAKERS 749, 749–63 (Regina Herzlinger ed., 2004).  
 320 Id. 
 321 I.R.C. §§ 106, 162 (2005). 
 322 The employer exclusion reduces income tax revenues by over $140 billion per 
year.  Leonard E. Burman & Jonathan Gruber, Tax Credits for Health Insurance, TAX 
POLICY ISSUES AND OPTIONS, June 2005, at 1 http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/ 
311189_IssuesOptions_11.pdf.  Including payroll taxes, the total revenue loss could 
be as much as $190 billion per year.  Id. 
 323 Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, Excerpt from Estimates of Federal Tax 
Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2005–2009, in FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 41, 41–46 (Michael J. Graetz & Deborah H. Schenk, eds., 2005). 
 324 See Burman & Gruber, supra note 322, at 1.  There is one notable exception to 
this rule: if an individual itemizes deductions, then health care expenses are de-
ductible to the extent that such expenses exceed 7.5% of the individual’s adjusted 
gross income (AGI) (anything above 7.5% of AGI is deductible).  I.R.C. § 213 (2005). 
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ployer: (1) give people a choice between a tax credit (a governmental 
disbursement that uses the IRS’s institutional competence to effectu-
ate accurate transfers) and a tax exclusion (the right to exclude em-
ployer-sponsored health benefits from income); (2) give people a 
choice between a tax deduction (the right to deduct from one’s in-
come the cost of health care purchased in the private market) and a 
tax exclusion (the right to exclude employer-sponsored health bene-
fits from income); and (3) eliminate the tax exemption (force em-
ployees to pay taxes on the health care benefits they receive from 
employers).325
(2) Risk-pooling 
Risk pooling is the crux of any insurance system; at some level, 
the healthy must subsidize the sick.  In our current regime, risk-
pooling occurs at the level of the employer (with the exception of 
governmentally-funded insurance such as Medicare and Medicaid).  
If the current tax favoritism of employer-sponsored care is removed 
and individuals begin to opt out of employer-based risk pooling, ad-
verse selection will run rampant.  The healthiest employees will pur-
chase experience-rated policies on the individual market, while the 
chronically ill are left to pool the risk amongst themselves.  Without 
subsidization from their comparatively healthy coworkers, such indi-
viduals are likely to find employer-sponsored insurance either non-
existent or prohibitively costly.326
The clearest solution to the problem is formal risk adjustment, a 
process whereby money is transferred according to individuals’ 
health care needs.  Risk adjustment can be performed at any one of 
three levels: the payer, the provider, or the patient. 
Risk adjustment at the level of the patient would require distrib-
uting money (or some form of currency that can be used to purchase 
health insurance) to individuals in accordance with their expected 
health care expenditures.  This can be done in two principal ways: (1) 
via a tax credit, or (2) via employers’ disparate contributions to em-
ployees’ premiums. 
If implemented at the level of the payer, any given insurance 
company would be required to charge all individuals the same price, 
regardless of their health, but the government (or some body acting 
on behalf of the government) would level the playing field by trans-
 325 The phrases “tax exclusion” and “tax exemption” are used interchangeably in 
this Article to refer to the fact that employees do not pay taxes on health benefits 
provided by their employers. 
 326 See Burman & Gruber, supra note 322, at 10. 
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ferring money from the insurers who enroll the healthiest patients to 
the insurers who enroll the chronically ill.  This is essentially the 
model on which the Netherlands operates.327  If risk adjustment were 
instituted at the level of the provider, any given physician or hospital 
would be required to charge all individuals the same price, regardless 
of their health, but the government (or some other publicly account-
able body) would level the playing field by transferring money from 
providers who deal with high-risk patients to providers who deal with 
low-risk patients.328
(3) One Possible Consumer-driven Regime 
As long as the tax code’s favoritism for employer-sponsored in-
surance is removed, formal risk adjustment is implemented at some 
level, and the government ensures that cost and quality data is readily 
available to the consumer,329 patients should have an incentive to seek 
out health plans and providers that prescribe in a socially rational 
fashion (taking into account the quality of post-marketing protocols).  
The following is merely one example of a system that has the power 
to curb pharmaceutical companies’ use of suboptimal protocols.330
Under the new consumer-driven system, Americans would have a 
choice between a tax credit sufficient to purchase basic health insur-
ance and the right to exclude employer-sponsored health benefits 
 327 Leida M. Lamers et al., Risk Adjusted Premium Subsidies and Risk Sharing: Key Ele-
ments of the Competitive Sickness Fund Market in the Netherlands, 65 HEALTH POLICY 49, 
49–62 (2003). 
 328 While the literature dealing with the subject suggests that risk adjustment 
would only be needed for capitated physician groups (those that accept fees on a 
per-patient basis rather than a per-episode basis), this may not be the case.  See Ben-
jamin Falit, The Bush Administration’s Health Care Solution: The Proper Establishment of a 
Consumer-Driven Health Care Regime, 34 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 632, 38 n.51 (2006).  
 329 The widespread availability of cost and quality data is a vital part of any con-
sumer-driven regime.  This section refrains from discussing this point in detail in or-
der keep the scope of the Article manageable.  See Herzlinger & Falit, supra note 309. 
 330 This section outlines very ambitious reform with poor political viability.  It of-
fers this cursory discussion merely as an interesting example of a type of consumer-
driven health care, rather than the optimal (either substantively or politically) solu-
tion.  In fact, I have elsewhere suggested that the best approach may be to couple a 
tax deduction for individually purchased insurance with risk adjustment at the level 
of the payer.  See Benjamin Falit, Address at the Seton Hall Law Review Health Law 
Symposium, The Right Drugs at the Right Prices: Optimizing Industry-Sponsored Re-
search by Perfecting the Healthcare Marketplace (Feb. 16, 2007) (recording avail-
able at http://lawmedia.shu.edu/audio/LawSymposium/LawSymposium3.wav); see 
also Herzlinger & Falit, supra note 309 (arguing for risk adjustment at the level of the 
payer). 
FALIT_FINAL 10/18/2007  8:47:37 AM 
2007] POST-APPROVAL TRIALS 1045 
 
from personal income taxes.331  Ideally, the tax credit would be both 
refundable (available to individuals who pay less in income taxes than 
the credit is worth) and advanceable (workers would have access to 
the credit at the time they have to pay insurance premiums).  Indi-
viduals would be permitted to spend the tax credit on health care ex-
penditures only.332
The exact amount of each credit would be based on two separate 
calculations.  Approximately eighty percent333 of the credit would be 
equal to the cost of treating the average similarly-situated334 individual 
during the previous year.335  For purposes of this calculation, each pa-
tient’s risk category would be based on all available evidence, includ-
ing all recent medical developments.  The other twenty percent of 
the credit would be based on an assessment, to be done at age eight-
een, of the individual’s expected lifetime medical requirements.336  
Each year, the patient would receive twenty percent of her estimated 
health care costs for the year (based on her health status at age eight-
een), only to be adjusted for medical inflation.337  Since this payment 
 331 The benefits and drawbacks associated with universal health care are beyond 
the scope of this paper, but it is important to note that universal coverage is not nec-
essary to the effectuation of this section’s proposal. 
 332 Requiring consumers to spend the disbursement on health care may encour-
age some overspending.  Such an outcome, however, is superior to the rampant 
fraud that would likely result from allowing individuals to spend the credit on any-
thing they desire.  See Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CAL. L. REV. 
1449, 1487–92 (1994). 
 333 The percentages used here (eighty and twenty) are open to debate.  The exact 
percentages should be the result of extensive empirical analysis. 
 334 “Similarly-situated” refers to an individual’s risk category. 
 335 Medicare’s CMS-HCC risk-adjustment model could be used to determine risk 
categories.  See generally Gregory C. Pope et al., Risk Adjustment of Medicare Capitation 
Payments Using the CMS-HCC Model, 25 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 119 (2004). 
 336 See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: ISSUES 
IN A MODERNIZED MEDICARE PROGRAM 52 (June 2005), available at 
http://www.medpac.gov/publications/congressional_reports/June05_Entire_report.
pdf.  Given the limited short-term predictability of health care costs using the CMS-
HCC risk adjustment model predictions of life-long expenditures at age eighteen are 
likely to be quite inaccurate.  This, however, makes little difference to the model.  
The point is simply that some percentage of the governmental disbursement must 
remain constant from year to year so that consumers have an incentive to plan for 
the long-term.  The larger the percentage of fixed disbursement, the more of an in-
centive there is to shop wisely and plan for the long-term, but the more likely it is 
that some individuals will be priced out of the market due to the onset of a costly ill-
ness.  For immigrants or other individuals who become eligible for health benefits 
after their eighteenth birthday, the calculation would be made as soon as possible 
after an eligibility decision has been rendered. 
 337 The phrase “only to be adjusted for medical inflation” refers to the idea that, if 
the cost of treating someone the patient’s age (not health status) went up by five per-
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does not adjust along with changes in one’s health status, it provides 
patients with an incentive to minimize health care costs over the long-
term, as opposed to looking only a year ahead.338
Since consumers would be able to keep the difference between 
what they receive from the government and what they pay for health 
care,339 they would have a powerful incentive to spend wisely.340  In 
other words, the power of the purse will vastly mitigate, if not alto-
gether eliminate, the irrational consumer demand for certain brand-
name drugs, which is pervasive under the current regime.  Armed 
with the information supplied by the newly-minted federal body em-
powered to comparatively evaluate alternative therapies, consumers 
will seek out physicians who are not improperly persuaded by meth-
odologically suboptimal trials. 
Under the current regime, employers offer their employees very 
few health insurance options.  Instead of offering a wide array of dif-
ferentiated policies, they use their purchasing power to secure two to 
three one-size-fits-all plans that appeal to the “average employee.”341  
Forced to accept whatever plans their employer offers, employees are 
unable to trade off drug benefits for premiums or alternative benefits 
by bargaining directly with the insurance company.  This inability to 
secure a quid pro quo creates a sense amongst employees that health 
care is free, and that one is entitled to the very best health care.  The 
cent since the individual’s initial assessment, the patient would receive five percent 
more than the payment originally calculated for that year. 
 338 If 100 percent of the credit were based on the cost of treating similarly-situated 
individuals during the previous year, consumers would have a perverse incentive to 
forego therapy that would prevent them from developing serious illnesses in later 
years.  In essence, they would have an incentive to plan only for the short term, for-
going economically efficient preventative care and lifestyle modifications.  Alterna-
tively, if one hundred percent were based on expected medical costs as of age eight-
een, patients who later (after age eighteen) develop a chronic illness through no 
fault of their own would not possess the financial resources needed to switch to an 
insurer that specializes in that particular illness (or might be priced out of the mar-
ket entirely). 
 339 Consumers could save the money for later years or spend it on more discre-
tionary health care consumption. 
 340 Since the proposed regime would create a perverse incentive for consumers to 
misrepresent their health status to the government in order to receive more money, 
two interventions would be needed.  First, the data presented to the government for 
risk adjustment purposes would be available to the insurance companies and provid-
ers with whom each individual attempts to contract (indeed, the insurers and pro-
viders would be providing much of the data).  A person who pretends to be sicker 
than she really is in order to receive a higher payout would therefore have to pay an 
artificially high premium for insurance.  Second, strict criminal penalties would be 
levied against individuals who intentionally or negligently defraud the system. 
 341 See, e.g., Herzlinger, Consumers in Charge, supra note 297. 
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ubiquity of such a sentiment makes it difficult for employers to offer 
restrictive formularies and pharmacy benefit managers to deny claims 
for brand name medications.  Under my proposal, consumers would 
be free to choose amongst a plethora of differentiated insurance op-
tions.342  They would shop around for insurance companies that selec-
tively deal with enlightened physicians, and look for innovative poli-
cies that offer lower premiums by reimbursing only the most cost 
effective drugs.  In the individual market, prospective enrollees would 
be able to trade off drug benefits for other plan advantages such as 
lower premiums.  Individuals’ understanding that they are receiving 
something in return for accepting reduced drug benefits would allow 
for the creation of more restrictive formularies and make it easier for 
pharmacy benefit managers to deny claims in cases where their enrol-
lees do not have a contractual right to the medication. 
The elimination of employer-sponsored insurance will make it 
possible for payers and providers to enter into long-term contracts 
with consumers, thereby aligning their incentives with those of pa-
tients.343  Reciprocal long-term agreements between insurers and pa-
tients will make it profitable for health plans to reimburse interven-
tions that are costly in the short-term but have the potential to 
significantly reduce long-term costs.  For the first time, patient educa-
tion initiatives designed to teach consumers about cost effective 
medications are likely to be profitable since the educating company 
will reap the long-term gain associated with enlightened enrollees.  
The use of formal risk adjustment will ensure that payers have an in-
centive to enroll the chronically ill and actively manage their disease 
with an eye toward long-term outcomes.  Similarly, the lure of finan-
cial gain will lead physicians to form comprehensive care teams that 
focus on particular chronic diseases and secure long-term capitation 
contracts from insurers or the patients themselves.344  Such care teams 
will compete on cost and quality data, with the most competitive phy-
sicians demonstrating that they save payers and consumers money by, 
among other things, prescribing in a cost effective manner. 
 342 Under the current regime, insurers have little incentive to differentiate them-
selves by specializing in particular disease processes since their primary customers are 
large employers with diverse employee populations.  Under the proposed system, 
however, insurers will likely specialize to suit diverse customer needs. 
 343 See supra Part IV.A.iv (discussing how the current regime leads insurers to focus 
on short-term costs); Herzlinger & Falit, supra note 309 (discussing in detail the in-
herent value in long-term contracts). 
 344 Herzlinger refers to such “comprehensive care teams” as “focused factories.”  
See REGINA E. HERZLINGER, MARKET-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 297, at 157-199. 
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In addition to collecting and disseminating comparative data on 
pharmaceuticals and alternative therapies, the federal government 
should require the disclosure of uniform cost and quality data from 
payers and providers.345  Private sector firms could then transform this 
information into easily understandable, comparative data that can be 
disseminated to consumers.  Patients who do not have the time, or 
simply do not care to review the federal agency’s comparative drug 
data, can assume that a physician group is highly ranked (in part) be-
cause of its proper prescribing habits, and/or a health plan is highly 
ranked (in part) because it utilizes superior drug reimbursement 
policies and selectively contracts with providers who are not swayed 
by methodological limitations.  Indeed, if the informational disclo-
sure requirements are sufficiently strict, there may be no need for a 
federal body that rates drugs.346
In essence, by improving the availability of comparative data on 
alternative therapies and health plans, eliminating the surrogate pur-
chasing of health insurance by employers, and implementing a pro-
gram of formal risk adjustment, the market for physician prescribing 
decisions and prescription drug coverage will be perfected.  For the 
first time, consumers will demand real value in their drugs and, if 
they don’t get it, they’ll take their money elsewhere.  A new line of 
physicians will be born who remain impervious to the influence of 
methodologically suboptimal trials.  Along with them will come a new 
breed of health plans that, freed from the shackles of irrational con-
sumer demand, will design and implement innovative reimbursement 
policies for prescription drugs.  With these two groups fighting for 
consumers’ rights to cost effective medicine, industry sponsors will no 
longer have an incentive to design methodologically suboptimal stud-
ies. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article articulated several ways in which industry sponsors 
may have incentives to design voluntary, non-label-seeking post-
approval studies that suboptimally inform the medical community 
 345 Herzlinger, Health Care SEC, supra note 309; Herzlinger & Falit, supra note 309. 
 346 There is no doubt that the availability of comparative data on drugs (generated 
by the federal body discussed above in text) would help patients to make more value-
conscious choices (which in turn would curb industry sponsors’ incentives to design 
methodologically suboptimal studies).  The only question is whether consumers’ in-
creased purchasing acumen would outweigh the cost of generating the information.  
Given the enormous expense associated with running additional trials and produc-
ing meaningful comparative data, it is likely that society would be best served by rely-
ing on macro-level cost and quality data. 
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but are more likely than optimal designs to generate favorable data.  
It did not, however, demonstrate that pharmaceutical companies act 
on these incentives.  Future research should attempt to determine 
whether industry trial designers are indeed more likely than disinter-
ested academics to design suboptimal protocols. 
Since it is likely impossible for anyone to determine, ex post, 
whether a given trial’s shortened time frame, use of surrogate out-
comes, or selective enrollment of subjects was socially desirable, the 
market may be the only mechanism powerful enough to align the in-
terests of industry and the public health.  This Article advocates the 
creation of a consumer-driven health care regime.  Creating a health 
care system in which patients have the information necessary to com-
pare the advantages and disadvantages of different treatments and a 
financial incentive to make value-maximizing purchases will decrease 
the potential profitability associated with designing suboptimal pro-
tocols.  In order to attract enlightened, value-conscious consumers, 
payers will compete to design innovative drug reimbursement policies 
and providers will clamor to demonstrate that they recommend only 
the most cost effective therapy. 
